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Why do individual differences in levels of traits such as 
assertiveness and sociability covary? Frequently, personal-
ity psychologists have answered this by appealing to broad 
factors identified by investigations of trait structure, such as 
the extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neurot-
icism, and intellect/openness factors that constitute the Big 
Five and Five Factor Model (FFM) frameworks (Goldberg, 
1993; McCrae & Costa, 2008), or the similar HEXACO fac-
tors (Ashton & Lee, 2007). Factors of this sort have sometimes 
been considered “source traits” or “basic tendencies” due to 
the assumption that they show some approximation to the 
most important sources “underlying” the more specific traits 
used to identify them (Cattell, 1950; McCrae & Costa, 1995). 
Here, we will describe how trait covariation can be ac-
counted for by functionalist or process approaches to be-
havior. Such frameworks understand behaviors as being 
means toward desired ends, and enlist constructs such as 
self-efficacies, expectancies, and values as preferred explan-
atory units (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; Bandura, 1977; Feather, 1982; 
Heckhausen, 1977; Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Vroom, 1964). 
Functionalist and process frameworks have typically been 
applied to understanding between-person or within-person 
variation of a single behavioral tendency; however, they 
have not typically been applied to understanding trait co-
variation, which is among the central phenomenon struc-
tural factors are enlisted to help explain (Ashton & Lee, 2005; 
Tellegen, 1991). 
Here, we will first briefly describe how structural ap-
proaches have traditionally been enlisted to account for trait 
covariation. We then describe how functionalist and process 
frameworks tend to explain behavioral trait levels, and how 
this understanding can be extended to explanations of trait 
covariation without invoking structural factors in an explan-
atory fashion. We illustrate this approach to trait covariation 
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Abstract
Factors identified in investigations of trait structure (e.g., the Big Five) are sometimes understood as explanations or 
sources of the covariation of distinct behavioral traits, as when extraversion is suggested to underlie the covariation of 
assertiveness and sociability. Here, we detail how trait covariation can alternatively be understood as arising from units 
common to functionalist and process frameworks, such as self-efficacies, expectancies, values, and goals. Specifically, 
the expected covariation between two behavioral traits should be increased when a specific process variable tends to 
indicate the functionality of both traits simultaneously. In 2 empirical illustrations, we identify a wide array of specific 
process variables associated with several Big Five-related behavioral traits simultaneously, and which are thus likely 
sources of their covariation. Many of these, such as positive interpersonal expectancies, self-regulatory skills, and pref-
erence for order, relate similarly to a broad range of trait perceptions in both studies, and across both self- and peer-
reports. We also illustrate how this understanding of trait covariation provides a somewhat novel explanation of why 
some traits are uncorrelated. As we discuss, a functionalist understanding of trait covariation as arising through func-
tionalist or process variables has implications for many basic issues in personality psychology, such as how person-
ality traits should be measured, mechanisms for personality stability and change, and the nature of personality traits 
more generally.
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through two empirical illustrations. As we will show, this re-
sults in a picture of the sources of trait covariation that looks 
quite different from the picture provided by structural fac-
tors. Finally, we will discuss some ways in which this func-
tionalist approach to covariation might be reconciled with 
structural approaches. Given the considerable role of struc-
tural factors such as the Big Five in contemporary personal-
ity psychology, we also outline some of the broader implica-
tions of a functional model of trait covariation.
Explanation of Behavioral Trait Covariation Through 
Broad Structural Factors
Beginning with Cattell’s (1946, 1950) work, structural ap-
proaches to the covariation of behavioral traits have regu-
larly proceeded by using factor analysis to identify factors 
(e.g., extraversion) which, in conjunction with factor load-
ings, can roughly reproduce the observed interrelationships 
between distinct behavioral traits (e.g., sociability, assertive-
ness, positive affectivity). In the simplest case where we are 
examining the correlation between two variables, factor anal-
ysis can always extract a single factor with factor loadings 
which will be precisely equal to the square root of the corre-
lation between the two variables. For instance, as shown in 
Figure 1A, if we were interested in identifying a factor un-
derlying the covariation between assertiveness and socia-
bility, and these two traits show an association of r = .49, 
we can use factor analysis to identify a factor which has .70 
loadings with both traits. These loadings mathematically 
serve as a way to externalize the correlation between the 
variables into a structural factor. In this example, by multi-
plying the .70 loadings with the factor together, we can say 
that assertiveness and sociability have an indirect .49 corre-
lation “through” the common factor, which we might label 
“extraversion.” 
When we are looking at the association of two variables, 
factor analysis and other structural techniques can always 
identify a single factor which can recover the association be-
tween variables perfectly. As the number of items in the anal-
ysis increases, a small number of factors will no longer be 
able to reproduce the correlations between items perfectly but 
may nonetheless be able to reproduce the original matrix quite 
well. Similarly, with more than two items the empirical factor 
estimates given to individuals will shift from a straight aver-
aging of the variables to a weighted average where items are 
weighted by their factor loadings.
There are a number of ways we might interpret the vari-
ables that result from analyses of trait structure. However, a 
Figure 1. Conceptualizations of sources of trait covariation consistent with structural equation models (Figure 1A) and functionalist 
frameworks (Figure 1B). Circles represent factors identified by structural analyses, boxes represent measured variables. Solid lines 
indicate positive effects and dashed lines indicate negative effects. In Figure 1A, structural factors are considered underlying factors 
of the measured traits; in Figure 1B, structural factors are considered composite averages (“components”) of the measured traits. 
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particularly influential perspective has been the understand-
ing that these may approximate the major causes of covaria-
tion among diverse traits. Cattell (1946) regularly discussed 
a factor resulting from these analyses as potentially approx-
imating a “source trait,” which can be thought of as a “cause 
or determiner of several trait-elements showing covariation” 
(Cattell, 1950, p. 33), and a “possible explanation of how the 
actually existing forms may have originated” (Cattell, 1946, 
p. 79). We believe this is the most intuitive way to inter-
pret the usual graphical representation of structural factors, 
which depict them as having causal effects on the narrower 
traits in the analysis, as shown in Figure 1A. 
In more contemporary personality psychology, this inter-
pretation of structural factors most clearly approximates the 
view traditionally described within the Five Factor Theory 
of McCrae and Costa (1995), where the Five Factors (which 
largely approximate the Big Five factors identified in lexi-
cal studies; Goldberg, 1993) are understood as “underlying 
tendencies [that] cause and thus explain (in general and in 
part) the consistent patterns of thoughts, feelings, and actions 
that one sees” (p. 236). However, other personality investi-
gators and methodologists sometimes discuss structural fac-
tors as approximating “underlying” constructs which “im-
pact” the narrower traits used to identify them (e.g., Caspi et 
al., 2014; DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson, 2007; Lewis & Bates, 
2014; Roberts, Chernyshenko, Stark, & Goldberg, 2005). 
There are a range of views as to the meaning of struc-
tural factors. Many personality investigators see such fac-
tors as providing a means to summarize and organize a per-
son’s standing on diverse traits. For instance, Eysenck (1970) 
suggests “we would be wrong in saying that a person be-
haves in a sociable fashion because he has the trait of socia-
bility, but then trait psychologists . . . [generally] postulate 
the trait in question simply as a descriptive variable” (p. 26), 
and similarly, Saucier and Goldberg (2001) note that analy-
ses of trait structure “can provide a framework for descrip-
tion, but not necessarily for explanation” (p. 848). From this 
perspective, an “extraversion” factor might be best regarded 
as a summary rather than as approximating a cause of ten-
dencies to be sociable, assertive, happy, sensation-seeking 
(e.g., John, Naumann, & Soto, 2008; Ozer & Reise, 1994; Wig-
gins, 1997; Wood, in press). As detailed in Figure 1B, this un-
derstands an individual’s standing on structural factors as 
caused by their standing on narrow factors (by means of a 
mathematical averaging) and not vice versa: the causal ar-
rows should point from the specific traits toward the struc-
tural factor. However, interpreting structural factors in 
this manner means that structural analyses may not get us 
much closer to understanding the sources of trait covaria-
tion. We are more or less back to square one: If extraversion 
is a summary rather than a common cause of the covarying 
tendencies to be sociable and assertive, than what causes 
these tendencies to covary? 
Functionalist Approaches to Trait Levels and Their 
Covariation 
We argue that trait covariation can be understood by 
an extension of how many functionalist or process ap-
proaches already explain trait variation. Consequently, we 
will first discuss how behavioral trait levels are considered 
to be shaped within a range of functionalist and process ap-
proaches, and then detail additional principles useful for ex-
tending this to the problem of trait covariation.
First, it is useful to describe how we will be using the term 
“trait.” There is a frequent tendency for researchers to equate 
traits with factors identified in studies of trait structure, as 
when investigators ask “How are values and goals associated 
with traits?” by correlating measures of such motivational 
units with a Big Five measure (e.g., Roberts & Robins, 2000; 
Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, & Knafo, 2002). However, we wish 
to clearly distinguish between these terms. First, we will re-
fer to structural factors as variables such as the Big Five or 
HEXACO factors that are identified by statistical procedures 
such as factor analysis. In contrast, we will use the term trait 
in a manner somewhat closer to Guilford’s (1959) definition 
of a trait as “any distinguishable, relatively enduring way 
in which one individual differs from others” (p. 6; Johnson, 
1999; Roberts, 2009). That is, a trait may range from an indi-
vidual’s tendency to be tall, male, right-handed, well-liked, 
sociable, trusting, like vanilla ice cream, or have a high tes-
tosterone level. Given the very wide range of traits individ-
uals can have, it is useful to identify conceptually impor-
tant trait classes, and how they should relate to one another. 
We use the term behavioral traits to be essentially synony-
mous with behavioral tendencies. This largely parallels mod-
els which conceptualize an individual’s level of a behavioral 
trait as the individual’s observed or expected likelihood of 
performing a certain class of behaviors (Buss & Craik, 1983; 
Fleeson, 2001; Wiggins, 1997). From a functional perspective, 
behaviors are generally understood as means to ends. For in-
stance, Almlund, Duckworth, Heckman, and Kautz (2011) 
consider an individual’s personality system to be “a strategy 
function for responding to life situations” (p. 8). Similar as-
sumptions are represented in a wide range of social–cogni-
tive, self-regulatory, evolutionary, and economic models of 
behavior (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; Carver & Scheier, 1998; Fleeson 
& Jolley, 2006; Gintis, 2007; Kenrick et al., 2009; Kruglanski 
et al., 2002; Minsky, 2007). We will refer to the idea that an 
individual’s behavioral trait levels are shaped, in large part, 
by their real or perceived functionality toward achieving the 
individual’s desired ends as the functionality assumption. 
1. Note that factor loadings can be used more effectively to reproduce the correlation matrix when using principal axis factoring (PAF) than prin-
cipal component analysis (PCA). This is because factor analysis by PAF will summarize only the interitem correlations, whereas PCA will addi-
tionally base factor loadings on item variances (i.e., the diagonals of the correlation matrix). If an individual’s level of a factor (e.g., extraversion) 
is considered simply a summary of the observed variables (e.g., extraversion equals the mean of the individual’s estimated sociability and asser-
tiveness, as represented in Figure 1B), the correlation between the individual’s standing on the structural factor and the original items will more 
closely approximated by the PCA loadings (in this example: approximately .87) than by the PAF loadings. Technically, when the variables iden-
tified in a factor analysis is considered as “unobserved hypothetical variables that underlie and explain the observed correlations” they are re-
garded as factors and if considered as “linear composites of observed variables” they are regarded as components or principal components (Loehlin, 
2004, pp. 28–29). For simplicity however, we will refer to variables such as the Big Five or HEXACO dimensions as structural factors regardless 
of whether they are understood as causes or summaries of covarying traits. 
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Functionality Indicators
Several models suggest that a behavior’s functionality to 
the actor can be understood as being established by the op-
eration of three additional broad trait classes; see especially 
Ajzen (1991), Bandura (1977), Feather (1982), Gintis (2007), 
Heckhausen (1977), Tolman (1938), and Vroom (1964). Spe-
cifically, the functionality of a behavior to an actor can be 
understood as being established by (a) ability/efficacy traits, 
which concern the individual’s expected ease of performing 
trait-identifying behaviors; (b) expectancy traits, which con-
cern the expected outcomes of an individual’s performance 
of such behaviors; and (c) valuation traits, which indicate the 
individual’s expected valuation of particular outcomes. We 
will refer to more specific traits that can be classified into 
these three trait classes collectively as functionality indicators, 
or FIs, to indicate that they can be understood to influence 
levels of a behavioral trait primarily by indicating or shap-
ing the behavior’s functionality to the actor. Specifically, an 
individual should have a higher level of a behavioral trait if 
he or she (a) tends to find the associated behaviors easy to 
do; (b) tends to expect them to increase the likelihood of par-
ticular outcomes (e.g., attention, power, acceptance); and (c) 
tends to value those outcomes. 
These units also correspond highly with major classes 
found in a range of social–cognitive and process models of 
behavior (e.g., Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Fleeson & Jolley, 2006; 
Mischel & Shoda, 1995). A theme we will revisit is that in-
dividuals’ own explanations for their high or low levels of a 
behavioral trait regularly enlist FIs. These three functionalist 
trait classes can thus be used to organize or classify different 
forms of explanations regarding why individuals have the 
traits that they do. We continue by elaborating on the nature 
of these trait classes, how they are linked to units in other 
prominent models of behavior, and their role in influencing 
behavioral trait levels. 
Abilities/efficacies. If we understand an individual’s 
behavior as means to desired ends, then abilities and effi-
cacies concern which means the individual has available. 
Abilities and efficacies are largely analogous to units such 
as intention-behavior or efficacy expectancies (Bandura, 1977; 
Heckhausen, 1977), and affordances, competencies, skills, capa-
bilities, constraints, and perceived behavioral control described 
in other frameworks (Ajzen, 1991; Almlund, Duckworth, 
Heckman, & Kautz, 2011; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Gibson, 
1977; Gintis, 2007). Units such as resources or self-regulatory 
plans/scripts (Fleeson & Jolley, 2006; Mischel & Shoda, 1995) 
can be thought of as linking to behavioral traits in large 
part by impacting more general abilities to perform associ-
ated behaviors. 
Within these and several other frameworks, individuals 
are assumed to operate by a law of least effort, choosing be-
haviors that require less expenditure of effort or resources 
(Brehm & Self, 1989; Kahneman, 2011; Thorndike, 1913). For 
instance, Ramona and Beatrice may both try to keep their 
rooms clean, but Ramona has an easy time doing so while 
Beatrice experiences this as more difficult and effortful; this 
difference in expected ease of performance will likely result 
in Ramona having a cleaner room. Ability traits do not con-
cern specifically how or why the person finds an action easy 
or hard to perform. Ramona might find it easier to keep her 
room clean due to having better organizational skills, having 
more energy or better cleaning supplies, or for other reasons. 
Abilities simply indicate that the actor somehow finds the 
behaviors associated with the behavioral trait easier to per-
form. An individual’s abilities and efficacies are indicated by 
explanations that begin with phrases such as “I [can/can’t] 
. . .” or “I find it [easy/difficult] to . . .” 
Expectancies. Whereas abilities concern the expected 
ease of performing a behavior, expectancies concern how 
the environment is expected to change or react after the be-
havior has been performed. Expectancies in this manner 
are most directly analogous to behavior-outcome expectan-
cies (Bandura, 1977; Heckhausen, 1977), and norms and con-
tingencies of reinforcement in other frameworks (Ajzen, 1991; 
Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Skinner, 1965). 
Within these and many other models, an individual’s 
behavioral tendencies are expected to follow the law of ef-
fect: increasing when they tend to have desirable or use-
ful effects on the environment, and decreasing when they 
do not (Skinner, 1981; Thorndike, 1913). To alter our pre-
vious example slightly, perhaps Ramona and Beatrice are 
equally capable of keeping their room clean, but it is the 
consequences of keeping their rooms clean that differ: Ra-
mona finds having a clean room leads to greater approval 
from her parents, while Beatrice does not. This will again 
likely result in Ramona having a cleaner room, due now to 
differences in this behavior’s expected effects. More gener-
ally, although many individuals may be equally afforded 
the opportunity to behave in a certain way, they may none-
theless differ in their behavioral traits due to differences in 
how their environment reacts to these behaviors. Such ex-
pectancies are indicated from explanations of behavior that 
begin with phrases such as “I [believe/feel/expect] that . . 
.” and “I find [doing X] to . . .” 
Valuations. Although different individuals may experi-
ence the same outcomes after performing a behavior, they 
may differ in the extent to which the outcomes are expe-
rienced as desirable and valuable, or useful to other ends. 
Whereas expectancy traits concern relations between be-
haviors and outcomes, valuation traits concern what out-
comes the actor finds desirable, or which ends they are try-
ing to maximize. Valuation traits have been referred to as 
instrumentalities (Feather, 1982; Vroom, 1964) in other ex-
pectancy-value frameworks, and as motives, needs, values, 
preferences, and contingencies of utility in other frameworks 
(Almlund et al., 2011; Atkinson, 1957; Gintis, 2007; Mischel 
& Shoda, 1995; Schwartz, 1992). Goals serve an analogous 
function in a range of social–cognitive and self-regulatory 
frameworks (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Dweck & Leggett, 
1988; Fleeson & Jolley, 2006; Kruglanski et al., 2002) in that 
they specify the ends a person would like to attain. 
Broadly, valuation traits should impact behavior by spec-
ifying the outcomes individuals are trying to promote. To al-
ter our example a final time, perhaps both Ramona and Be-
atrice can keep their rooms clean with equal ease, and both 
receive equal approval from their parents if their room is 
clean. However, Ramona experiences her parents’ approval 
as rewarding and desirable, whereas Beatrice does not. This 
should again result in Ramona having a cleaner room. Valu-
ation traits are indicated from explanations of behavior that 
begin with phrases such as “I [like/dislike] . . .”, I [value/
care about] . . .”, and “I typically [try/want] to . . .”
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Explaining Behavioral Trait Levels by Functionality 
Indicators
Considered collectively, behaviors which an individual 
finds easy to perform and which are expected to result in 
effects the individual finds valuable can be understood as 
having higher functionality, utility, or expected value (Atkin-
son, 1957; Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Feather, 1959; Gintis, 2007; 
Tolman, 1938). In turn, such behaviors should have greater 
motivational force (Vroom, 1964), and become the individu-
al’s behavioral intentions (Ajzen, 1991). Through this process, 
behaviors with high real or perceived functionality to the ac-
tor should be expected to increase in frequency, and conse-
quently behavioral trait levels should come to be correlated 
with their functionality to the actor. There are a couple points 
worth briefly noting concerning this manner of explanation. 
First, it is not necessary to posit individuals as consciously 
calculating the functionality of every behavior they perform 
to understand behavioral traits as shaped in this manner. 
Considerations of whether the behavior is more desirable 
than alternatives may often be made in a very quick man-
ner outside of conscious awareness (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 
1996; Kahneman, 2011). Behavioral tendencies can also be 
effectively shaped by their functionality by simple learn-
ing processes rather than by conscious deliberation (Skin-
ner, 1981; Thorndike, 1913). An individual’s current levels 
of behavioral traits can frequently be understood as being 
shaped by their past functionality, and then operate princi-
pally as habits (Allport, 1937; James, 1890; W. Wood & Neal, 
2007). This can lead current behavioral trait levels to depart 
from their current functionality. 
Second, as noted by McCabe and Fleeson (2012), the shap-
ing of behavior by process variables should be understood 
as operating first and foremost at the within-person level of 
analysis. For instance, individuals will tend to act extraverted 
in moments when they want to promote extraverted-related 
ends (e.g., make friends, convey information, entertain oth-
ers), and more introverted when they don’t. However, as 
they also note, individuals also differ in how much they typ-
ically desire such ends, and consequently functional expla-
nations should be able to be generalized to explaining not 
just within-person variation, but much between-person vari-
ation in behavioral trait levels as well. 
Third, a given behavior should be understood as having a 
wide range of effects on the environment (Bertalanffy, 1968; 
Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Kruglanski et al., 2002). For instance, 
behaving in the manner we label responsible may tend to in-
crease the fulfillment of commitments to others, interper-
sonal relatedness, status, effort expenditure, among many 
other things. In turn, functional frameworks regard behav-
ioral trait levels as being considerably shaped by the func-
tionality of their effects. In an important sense, the behavior’s 
effects are the behavior’s causes: through various mecha-
nisms, behaviors with the more functional effects are selected 
over alternatives (Skinner, 1981; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). 
This leads fairly directly to the expectation that func-
tional explanations of behavioral trait levels should be fairly 
complex. The overall functionality which shapes behav-
ioral trait levels is itself conceptualized as representing the 
sum of probabilities that a behavior will affect diverse out-
comes, weighted by the actor’s valuation of each outcome 
(Feather, 1982; Fishbein, & Ajzen, 1975; Gintis, 2009). Con-
sequently, we should be able to influence an individual’s 
level of a behavioral trait by influencing a wide range of FIs. 
For example, we may be able to increase an actor’s level of 
responsible behavior by making the actor care more about 
others impacted by such actions, making “irresponsible” al-
ternatives less tempting or less available, increasing the link 
between responsible action and long-term goal attainment 
(e.g., raises, promotions), making it easier to behave respon-
sibly, or by several other routes (Magidson, Roberts, Col-
lado-Rodriguez, & Lejuez, 2012; Wood, Larson, & Brown, 
2009). This can be understood more generally as the prin-
ciple that there are usually multiple means to a given end 
(Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Bertalanffy, 1968; Kruglanski et 
al., 2002), and parallels social–cognitive explorations of the 
diverse processes that influence a specific behavioral trait 
(e.g., Dweck & Leggett, 1988; McCabe & Fleeson, 2012; Met-
calfe & Mischel, 1999; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). 
Explaining Behavioral Trait Covariation by  
Functionality Indicators
We have just described that a particular behavioral trait 
should have diverse effects. However, any particular trait 
should be understood as potentially affecting many other 
traits simultaneously. Particularly important to our function-
alist explanation of trait covariation is the fact that any par-
ticular FI or process variable may affect the functionality of 
several distinct behavioral traits simultaneously (e.g., Lu-
kaszewski, 2013). 
Mathematically, when one of the various FIs that affects 
one behavioral trait also affects a distinct behavioral trait, 
we can multiply this FI’s correlations with the two traits to-
gether to estimate the expected correlation between the two 
traits “through” the FI. For instance, the tendency to see oth-
ers positively has been found to show moderate correlations 
with traits in all Big Five trait domains (Wood, Harms, & 
Vazire, 2010), which suggests that seeing others positively 
might tend to increase levels of kindness, sociability, asser-
tiveness, responsibility, and so on. Because multiple traits are 
impacted by a common FI in this example, this should result 
in some level of covariation between these traits. As depicted 
hypothetically in Figure 1B, if perceiving others positively 
has a .30 effect on assertiveness and a .40 effect on sociabil-
ity, this should result in a .30 × .40 = .12 increase in the cor-
relation between these two traits “through” the tendency to 
see others positively. 
More generally, when a particular FI tends to influence 
two behaviors in the same direction simultaneously, this 
will serve to increase the correlation between the behavioral 
traits, and when a particular FI tends to increase levels of 
one behavioral trait but decrease levels of another, this will 
serve to decrease the correlation between the two traits (i.e., 
make the correlation more negative). Note that this is largely 
the same way that structural factors are enlisted to explain 
covariation: By comparing Figures 1A and 1B, we see that 
structural factors such as extraversion and FIs such as “per-
ceiving others positively” are both cast as common causes of 
diverse behavioral traits, and thus sources of covariation. 
Differences in structural and functional explanations of 
correlated traits. However, beyond this similarity there are 
some important differences. One concerns the nature of the 
explanatory variable. A structural factor is not measured sep-
arately from the traits it is posited to influence, but rather is 
generally “inferred” from their covariation. It is this concern 
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that has led some to regard such explanations of covariation as 
circular (e.g., Cervone, 1999; Mischel, 1968). In contrast, there 
are various reasons to think that explanations of behavioral 
trait covariation by FIs are less prone to circularity. For in-
stance, when we find a tendency to see others positively (a 
type of expectancy) to relate to behavioral traits in several dif-
ferent Big Five domains (Wood, Harms, et al., 2010), it is not 
difficult to see functional reasons for these relationships. Indi-
viduals who expect others to have negative traits may sensibly 
see little value in meeting and socializing with others (acting 
extraverted and open), being nice to others (acting agreeably), 
and completing their commitments (acting conscientious), and 
adjust their behavioral tendencies accordingly. 
A second important difference concerns the number of 
variables that will be necessary to explain covariation. Con-
trolling for an FI will tend to reduce the association of the 
two variables toward zero, but because several FIs should 
influence levels of a given behavioral trait independently of 
one another, several distinct FIs should typically be neces-
sary to fully explain the correlation between two variables, 
analogous to multiple mediation. For instance, we may find 
that positive perceptions of others, social skills, enjoyment 
of attention, disliking solitude, and other distinct FIs may be 
necessary to fully explain the covariation between assertive-
ness and sociability. Whereas structural factor models may 
explain the covariation of several distinct behavioral traits 
through a single structural factor, a functionalist explanation 
of covariation suggests that there will generally be several 
distinct FIs that must be identified to understand why even 
two behavioral traits covary at the level they do.
Differences in structural and functional explanations of 
uncorrelated traits. Structural investigations frequently place 
a considerable emphasis on identifying orthogonal factors. 
This effort is motivated in part by the understanding that 
correlated traits have common causes, while uncorrelated 
factors may not (Ashton, Lee, Goldberg, & de Vries, 2009; 
DeYoung, 2006). However, given that functionalist frame-
works construe levels of any particular behavioral trait as 
being shaped by many distinct FIs or process variables (e.g., 
Cramer et al., 2012; Fleeson & Jolley, 2006; Kruglanski et al., 
2002; Mischel & Shoda, 1995), it may actually be more sur-
prising to find that uncorrelated behavioral traits share none 
of these in common. Instead, we expect that uncorrelated be-
havioral traits will generally share some common FIs, but 
that the FIs that increase the correlation between the two 
traits are equal in strength to the FIs that decrease the corre-
lation, and thus pull for correlations between the two traits 
in opposite directions which suppress one another (mathe-
matically cancel out; MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000). 
To illustrate, as shown in Figure 1B, we might observe 
that tendencies to be assertive and polite have an estimated 
correlation near r = 0. However, if we were to examine the 
various FIs which influence an individual’s levels of asser-
tive and polite behavior, we might find that these two ten-
dencies do in fact share some FIs that influence both traits si-
multaneously. For instance, desiring power likely increases 
assertiveness but decreases politeness (Harms, Roberts, & 
Wood, 2007; Roberts, O’Donnell, & Robins, 2004), while per-
ceiving others positively likely increases both assertiveness 
and politeness (Wood, Harms, et al., 2010). These and other 
FIs may suppress one another, resulting in a negligible corre-
lation between the two traits. Thus, an observed correlation 
near zero between two behavioral traits may regularly mask 
the fact that various specific FIs or process variables are com-
mon influences on both traits. 
Two Empirical Illustrations 
Although some investigators have begun to provide em-
pirical accounts of how diverse behavioral traits central to 
the Big Five may be shaped by a common FI (e.g., Lukasze-
wski, 2013; Wood, Harms, et al., 2010), past empirical re-
search has typically only examined one or a few FIs that may 
promote a range of behaviors or self-perceptions associated 
with Big Five traits within a single investigation. We thus 
conducted two studies to identify more comprehensively the 
major FIs that may shape levels of Big Five-related behav-
ioral traits and their covariation. We aimed to identify spe-
cific FIs which may be common causes of traits within the 
same Big Five domain (e.g., sociability and assertiveness), of 
correlated traits in different Big Five domains (e.g., sociabil-
ity and politeness), and of negligibly correlated traits (e.g., 
orderliness and anxiety). 
For Study 1, we adapted a qualitative-to-quantitative ap-
proach frequently utilized by Buss and colleagues (e.g., Buss, 
Gomes, Higgins, & Lauterbach, 1987; Kyl-Heku & Buss, 1996; 
Meston & Buss, 2007; see also Yang et al., 2014) where many 
reasons for performing trait-related behaviors are first gen-
erated through a qualitative method, and then transformed 
into questionnaire items and empirically evaluated as corre-
lates of these behavioral traits in a new sample. This method 
was adopted in large part because, as noted by Johnson 
(1999), people spontaneously explain actions by “suggest-
ing that the actor (a) desired a certain goal, (b) believed that 
the action would help him/her reach the goal, and (c) had 
the ability to perform the act” (p. 449; Malle, 1999). That is, 
the reasons people give can typically be classified as FIs. 
For Study 2, we aimed to replicate the major contours 
of Study 1 by utilizing the massive International Personal-
ity Item Pool (IPIP) and other resources collected within the 
Eugene-Springfield Community Sample (ESCS) to replicate 
major features of the FIs that may underlie trait covariation 
identified in Study 1. Because these participants were also 
rated by close others, we were afforded the opportunity to 
examine how FIs were associated not just with self-percep-
tions, but with how participants were perceived by others.
Measurement Strategy
Many of the FIs that promote behavioral traits and trait 
perceptions central to the Big Five are certain to be indicated 
by items already found in existing personality trait measures. 
For instance, people regularly explain that they act sociably 
because they enjoy social interactions, and items concerning 
enjoyment of social interactions can be found within common 
Extraversion scales. A functionalist framework can be used as 
a classification framework which suggests that items referring 
to FIs (e.g., enjoying social interactions; having social skills) 
and to behavioral tendencies (e.g., socializing) should be clas-
sified into separate categories even if highly correlated. In es-
sence, placing such items on a single scale confounds func-
tional causes with their behavioral effects. Consequently, we 
separate items referring to behavioral tendencies and abstract 
trait perceptions from items referring fairly explicitly to abil-
ities/efficacies, expectancies, and valuations.
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An important reason for doing this is because we are in-
terested in documenting the wide range of distinct behav-
ioral traits and self-perceptions that might be associated with 
a single FI. Indeed, this is central to our functionalist expla-
nation of trait covariation. Separating the measurement of FIs 
from behavioral traits affords the ability to identify whether 
a particular FI is associated with behavioral traits across mul-
tiple trait domains simultaneously. For instance, although 
liking other people may relate highly to sociability, it may 
also relate to tendencies to be assertive, warm, polite, and re-
sponsible. First aggregating such items into a measure of a 
structural factor renders such associations almost invisible.
Analysis Strategy
The models outlined in Figures 1A and 1B provide very 
different explanations of trait covariation that are not eas-
ily compared statistically. For instance, it may not be par-
ticularly impressive to show that a large number of FIs do 
a better job of explaining behavioral trait covariation than 
a small number of structural factors, as a large number of 
variables will always better predict an outcome (e.g., obtain 
a greater R2) relative to a small number of variables when 
other conditions are held equal (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Ai-
ken, 2003). Nor would fixing the number of FIs to the num-
ber of structural factors offer a fair test, as structural factors 
are identified precisely by their capability to maximally “ex-
plain” trait covariation and are not measured independently 
of these traits, whereas the FIs are measured with unreliabil-
ity and independently from the behavioral traits they are as-
sociated with. 
The overarching goal of these analyses can be considered 
to be the identification of a more empirically informed spec-
ification of Figure 1B, by identifying specific FIs that are as-
sociated with the variation and covariation of different Big 
Five-related traits. As noted above, we generally expect that 
(a) highly correlated traits will have several distinct FIs that 
are associated with both traits; and that (b) uncorrelated 
traits will typically also have various FIs that are associated 
with both traits, but in a configuration where some FIs re-
late positively or negatively to both traits (serving to increase 
their positive correlation), while others relate positively to 
one trait but negatively to the other (serving to increase their 
negative correlation). 
Study 1: Relations Between FIs and Big Five-Related 
Behavioral Traits 
Method
A summarized description of the Method is given here, 
which is expanded in the Supplementary Materials (S1).
Generating potential FIs involved in shaping Big Five-
related behavioral trait levels. A total of 529 Wake Forest 
University undergraduates completed an online survey for 
credit toward a course research participation requirement 
(Mage = 18.7; 59% female). 
Participants completed the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John 
et al., 2008), the Inventory of Individual Differences in the 
Lexicon (IIDL; Wood, Nye, & Saucier, 2010), and items from 
the IPIP (Goldberg, 1999) identified as highly associated with 
Big Five trait levels; scores for each dimension were stan-
dardized and averaged. Five to six individuals with the 
highest and lowest levels of each Big Five trait were inter-
viewed for additional credit, resulting in a total of 52 inter-
views. Interviewed participants were asked to describe the 
extent that they performed behaviors related to the trait they 
were selected for, and their reasons for doing so. Addition-
ally, approximately half of the participants (N = 229) were 
asked to describe someone they knew who was high or low 
on one Big Five trait, to describe instances of this person act-
ing in this way, and to suggest their reasons for doing so. 
Research assistants extracted reasons for trait-related be-
havior from the participant interviews and reports of others’ 
behavior. We considered appropriate reasons for trait-related 
behavior to be those that could be classified into roughly the 
FI classes described earlier: statements of abilities and effi-
cacies; expectancies of behavioral effects; and of valuations 
and goals. A total of 1,985 reasons for performing trait-re-
lated behaviors were initially extracted from these sources, 
which was reduced to a smaller set of 463 by eliminating 
redundancies.
Linking functionality indicators to Big Five-related 
traits. A second group of students (N = 511; age M = 18.7; 
57% female) completed items describing their levels of these 
FIs and of Big Five-related traits via an online survey. 
Measures of Big Five-related behavioral traits. Using items 
from the BFI (John et al., 2008) and IIDL (Wood, Nye, & Sauc-
ier, 2010), we estimated two behavioral traits within each Big 
Five trait domain. We excluded items that concerned self-
perceptions of valuations or goals, abilities, or expectancies. 
We also attempted to measure traits close to the two major 
subfacets within each Big Five domain as described by DeY-
oung, Quilty, and Peterson (2007) and Soto and John (2009). 
Following these considerations, the items used to construct 
these 10 scales are given in Appendix A; alpha values are 
provided in Table 1. 
Functionality indicators of Big Five-related behaviors. The 463 
reasons identified above were adapted into questionnaire 
statements using four different question-response formats. 
Items pertaining to likes and dislikes were rated under the 
instruction “How much do you like or dislike the following 
things?” (1 = strongly dislike this to 5 = strongly like this), and 
to goals under the instruction “How much do you try or want 
to do the following behaviors?” (1 = I try very hard to avoid do-
ing this to 5 = I try very hard to do this). Items pertaining to 
abilities were rated under the instruction “How easy or hard 
do you find doing the following things when you try to (or 
feel that you should)?” (1 = I find it very difficult to do this to 5 
= I find it very easy to do this). All remaining items were rated 
under the general instruction “How much do you agree with 
each statement?” (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree). 
The complete item set is available from the first author. 
We then reduced the set of 463 items to a more manage-
able set of approximately 100 items using cluster analysis 
techniques (see Wood, Nye, & Saucier, 2010) resulting in the 
initial extraction of 87 clusters. We then correlated all 463 
items with the 61 items of the IIDL to identify one item from 
each initial cluster that best represented the pattern of asso-
ciations linking the cluster to the IIDL, and to identify addi-
tional items that showed particularly large correlations with 
a single IIDL item, or correlated above an absolute magni-
tude of .20 with 10 or more IIDL items, resulting in the iden-
tification of 12 additional items for a total of 99 FI items. 
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Results and Discussion
Interrelationships between self-perceptions of Big Five-
related traits. The interrelationships between the 10 Big Five-
related traits are shown in Table 1. Generally there were 
strong relationships between aspects usually regarded as 
being within the same Big Five domain. However, we also 
found regular correlations between traits considered to be 
in different domains. Consistent with past research (DeY-
oung, 2006), traits across the agreeableness, conscientious-
ness, and emotional stability domains tended to correlate 
with one another, as did traits across the extraversion and 
intellect/openness domains. 
Relations between functionality indicators and trait co-
variation. We explored three main questions concerning the 
interrelations of FIs and behavioral traits: (a) which specific 
FIs may underlie the covariation found between traits within 
the same Big Five trait domain (e.g., sociability and asser-
tiveness); (b) which specific FIs are associated with corre-
lated traits in different trait domains (e.g., sociability and po-
liteness or creativity); and (c) are there specific FIs that are 
commonly associated with negligibly correlated behavioral 
traits (e.g., assertiveness and politeness)? To explore these 
questions, we correlated all 99 FI items with the 10 Big Five-
related traits. In Table 2, FI items are ordered by the trait 
they have the largest association with, except for items #89–
#99, which are placed at the bottom of the table due to hav-
ing no associations above | r| = .20. To draw out more gen-
eral themes, we summarize themes of how FI items related 
to these traits by paraphrasing the items while indicating 
where the full items can be found in Table 2 in parentheses. 
Question 1: What FIs are associated with behavioral traits 
within the same Big Five domain? For each pair of Big Five-
related traits, we list the number of FI items that correlate 
above | r| = .20 for both traits, and then enter these traits 
into a cluster analysis to organize similarities. We then de-
scribe each large group of items from these cluster analy-
ses in the text, and also single items that were associated 
with both traits but that appeared unassociated with these 
clusters. A virtue of this method is that different groups de-
scribed in the text will generally contribute to covariation in-
dependently of one another if entered into a simultaneous 
regression, and thus provide relatively distinct paths to the 
covariation of the two traits. 
Assertiveness and sociability. As shown in Table 2, assertive-
ness and sociability were commonly associated with 21 of the 
99 FI items which could be roughly organized in four groups. 
The first (#1, #7, #9, #10, #18) largely concerned positive so-
cial expectations (e.g., feeling unafraid of social situations). 
The second (#6, #8, #11, #12, #16, #14) concerned feeling it 
was important and enjoyable to be part of social interactions. 
The third (#4, #15) concerned liking and being able to open 
up to others. The fourth (#82, #83, #84) concerned ease of 
taking risks and trying new things. Fairly distinct from these 
groups, individuals who reported being able to put things in 
perspective (#74) and follow through with plans (#59), and 
liking confronting others (#2) and debating ideas with oth-
ers (#3) tended to report greater sociability and assertiveness. 
Kindness and warmth. Both traits were commonly associ-
ated with 35 FI items, in roughly three clusters. The first 
(#9, #7, #13, #16, #19, #20, #24) concerned feeling able to be 
friendly and comfortable toward others. The second (#21, 
#22, #23, #25, #33, #35, #37, #58, #60) concerned perceptions 
that one should accept and act dependably toward others. 
The third (#29, #38, #39, #40, #41, #42, #43, #44) concerned 
finding disrespecting others acceptable/enjoyable. Addition-
ally, individuals who reported trying to see the beauty in 
things (#86), and being able to regulate their actions (#64) 
and anger (#77), and to act “normally” (#88) tended be re-
port both more kindness and warmth.
Orderliness and reliability. Both traits were commonly asso-
ciated with seven items, in approximately two clusters. The 
first (#52, #55, #59) concerned ease of managing time and 
tasks. The second (#50, #51, #57, #65) concerned feeling that 
orderly was important.
Anxiety and irritability. Both traits were commonly asso-
ciated with 12 items, in roughly two clusters. The first (#72, 
#73, #74, #75, #77) concerned ease of putting things in per-
spective and brushing off negative judgments. The second 
(#24, #29, #69) concerned perceptions that others were not 
helpful or good-natured. Somewhat distinctly, individuals 
who reported being unable to keep attention on tasks (#55), 
feeling upset when plans change (#68), and who enjoyed 
gossiping about others (#42) reported both greater anxiety 
and irritability.
Table 1. Relationships Between Big Five-Related Traits. 
Trait Assert        Social            Kind       Polite       Orderly Relia     Anxious         Irrit          Creat      Unconv
Assertive (.83)
Sociable .51 (.89)
Kind .11 .44 (.77)
Polite –.09 .24 .63 (.72)
Orderly .05 .05 .07 .07  (.86)
Reliable .11 .19 .40 .41  .32 (.75)
Anxious –.14 –.16 –.21 –.26 .04 –.08 (.80)
Irritable .10 –.11 –.36 –.48 –.04 –.16 .56 (.77)
Creative .28 .29 .20 .14  –.07 .10 –.21 –.05 (.83)
Unconventional .15 –.01 –.23 –.26 –.16 –.19 –.05 .15 .15 (.36)
N = 511. All |rs| ≥ .09 are significant (p < .05). Correlations above .20 have additionally been shown in bold. Reliabilities are 
shown on the diagonal in parentheses. Items used to construct the trait scales are given in the text. “Assert” = Assertive, “Social” = 
Sociable, “Polite” = Polite, “Relia” = Reliable, “Irrit” = Irritable, “Creat” = Creative, “Unconv” = Unconventional.
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Creativity and unconventionality. Both traits were com-
monly associated with 5 items. The most highly associated 
items (#3, #80, #82) concerned enjoying abstract ideas, debat-
ing ideas with others, and standing out from others. Some-
what distinctly, individuals reporting greater ease in taking 
risks (#84) and who disagreed that routines helped make 
them feel secure (#54) tended to report more creativity and 
unconventionality.
Question 2: What FIs are commonly associated with correlated 
behavioral traits in different Big Five domains? We next conducted 
analyses to explore the FIs that might underlie the covariation 
of traits typically categorized under different Big Five factors. 
We first explored FIs associated with both sociability and po-
liteness (r = .24), and sociability and creativity (r = .29), again 
focusing primarily on items associated above |r| ≥ .20 with 
both traits. We then explore FIs that were correlated with traits 
in several Big Five domains simultaneously.
Sociability and politeness. Both traits were commonly asso-
ciated with ease of being friendly (#7, #19, #20); expecting 
comfort and acceptance from others (#9, #69); valuing a pos-
itive outlook (#21) and socializing (#16); and greater goals 
of trying new things (#85), having self-confidence (#26), and 
making friends (#13).
Sociability and creativity. Both traits were associated with 
increased enjoyment, effort, and ease of engaging and ex-
pressing oneself in social interactions (#1, #3, #4, #6, #7, #8, 
#11, #10, #14, #18, #82); with ease of putting things in per-
spective (#74, #75), and of coming up with creative ideas 
(#78); and with both the desire and ease of trying new things 
and taking risks (#83, #84, #85).
Question 2B: What FIs are associated with behavioral traits 
in several Big Five domains simultaneously? Paralleling other 
studies that have examined the intercorrelations among be-
havioral traits, we can see in Table 1 that there were almost 
invariably significant positive correlations between every 
pairwise combination of sociability, kindness, politeness, re-
liability, creativity, and assertiveness, and negative correla-
tions between these traits with anxiety, irritability, and un-
conventionality. Although this is sometimes interpreted as 
an artifact of the blending of orthogonal factors (Ashton et 
al., 2009) or the product of higher order factors (DeYoung, 
2006), this phenomenon can alternatively be understood as 
indicating the existence of FIs which influence the function-
ality of many distinct behavioral traits simultaneously. As 
can be seen from Table 2, numerous FIs were associated with 
most traits simultaneously. We list some themes below. 
Ease in social situations. Items concerning ease and comfort 
in social situations (#6, #7, #9, #10, #18) tended to be most 
associated with sociability and assertiveness, but also related 
positively to kindness, politeness, and creativity, and nega-
tively to irritability and anxiety.
Negative expectations of social situations. Individuals who 
expected that others would not accept or help them (#29, 
#69) especially reported lower kindness and politeness and 
greater anxiety and irritability, but also reported somewhat 
lower assertiveness, sociability, reliability, and creativity.
Importance placed on acting positively. Individuals who felt 
that others depended on them (#60), that they should have a 
positive outlook (#21) and take part in social situations (#16), 
and who tried to be successful (#61) and develop self-confi-
dence (#26), tended to be more sociable, kind, polite, assertive, 
reliable, and creative, and less anxious and irritable.
Interpersonal skills. Individuals who reported greater ease 
in acting “normal” (#88) and friendly (#19), accepting oth-
ers (#27), and seeing the positive side of situations (#75), re-
ported greater kindness, politeness, sociability, and reliabil-
ity, and less anxiety and irritability.
Self-regulatory and task related abilities. Individuals who re-
ported greater ease of regulating their actions (#50, #55, #64), 
and who liked working hard (#62) tended to report being 
more reliable, orderly, kind, polite, and sociable, and less 
anxious, irritable, and unconventional.
Importance and ease of seeing and doing things differently. Indi-
viduals who placed greater importance in seeing different per-
spectives (#36) and trying new things (#85), and who found 
it easy to come up with creative ideas (#78), tended to report 
especially higher creativity and unconventionality, but also 
higher assertiveness, sociability, kindness, and politeness.
Enjoyment of being different. Individuals who enjoyed be-
ing different from the crowd (#82) and provoking reactions 
from others (#87) particularly reported being more creative 
and unconventional, but also being more assertive, sociable, 
and less orderly.
Question 3: What FIs are commonly associated with uncor-
related behavioral traits? As we have suggested, even uncor-
related traits should regularly share FIs in an arrangement 
such that some FIs show same-sign correlations and others 
opposite-sign correlations in about equal magnitude. We ex-
plore this idea by examining two trait pairs that show near-
zero correlations in Table 2: orderliness and anxiety (r = .04), 
and assertiveness and politeness (r = −.09). In the text, we 
discuss FIs that were significantly associated (p < .05) with 
both traits simultaneously. 
Orderliness and anxiety. Tendencies to be orderly and 
anxious were commonly associated with 23 FI items. Both 
were positively associated with believing order was impor-
tant (#49, #51, #57), and with concern about messing up on 
tasks (#70) or changing plans (#68). Orderliness and anxiety 
were both higher among people who liked structure (#53, 
#54, #65), being a “perfectionist” (#56), and being seen as 
“right” (#71), and were both lower among people who liked 
abstract ideas (#80), being different from others (#82), and 
who strove to try new things (#85). However, ease of man-
aging time (#52), staying on task (#55), self-regulating (#64), 
and acting “normally” (#88) were associated with increased 
orderliness but decreased anxiety.
These results thus indicate that concerns and preferences 
for order may serve to increase both orderliness and anxi-
ety, but abilities to create or maintain order may serve to in-
crease orderliness but decrease anxiety. These FIs appear to 
suppress one another and result in the near-zero association 
between these traits. 
Assertiveness and politeness. Tendencies to be assertive and 
polite were commonly associated with 39 FIs. Both were pos-
itively associated with ease and enjoyment of socializing (#7, 
#9, #10, #11, #12, #13, #16, #18, #69); effort and enjoyment 
in doing well (#61, #62, #65, #66); and ease of thinking cre-
atively and rationally (#63, #78), putting things in perspec-
tive (#74, #75), staying organized (#50) and staying calm in 
tense situations (#72). Both were negatively associated with 
perceiving talkative people as annoying (#30) and enjoy-
ing silence (#31). However, perceiving more ease and value 
in confronting or provoking others (#2, #34, #38, #39, #43, 
#44, #45, #87) was associated with greater assertiveness but 
F u n c t i o n a l i s t  a n d  P r o c e s s  a P P r o a c h e s  t o  B e h a v i o r  e x P l a i n  t r a i t  c o v a r i a t i o n   95
decreased politeness, and ease of managing anger (#77) was 
associated with higher politeness but lower assertiveness.
Across both examples, we see that behavioral traits reg-
ularly share many common FIs even when they are almost 
perfectly uncorrelated, arrayed such that some showed 
same-sign associations and others opposite-sign associa-
tions with the two traits. This is consistent with our under-
standing that uncorrelated behavioral traits should generally 
be expected to be influenced by common FIs that suppress 
one another, rather than by entirely separate systems of FIs.
Study 2: Relations Between FIs and Big Five-Related 
Traits Within the IPIP
The IPIP (Goldberg et al., 2006) consists of a set of nearly 
2,500 items completed by participants in the ESCS. Most par-
ticipants have both self- and peer-ratings of Big Five-related 
traits similar to those examined in Study 1, affording the po-
tential to test whether the major contours of relations between 
FIs and Big Five-related traits described in Study 1 replicate 
in a new sample, and across both self- and other-perceptions. 
Again, we present a summarized description of the Method 
which is expanded in the Supplementary Materials (S1). 
Method
Participants. A total of 700 ESCS participants completed 
the materials examined here as part of an ongoing study. 
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 85 (M = 51.4, 56% fe-
male), and were of all levels of education (see Goldberg, 2008 
for additional details. 
Materials: Saucier Mini-Markers. In this study, we utilized 
the Saucier Mini-Markers (SMM; Saucier, 1994) as our mea-
sure of personality as it was administered multiple times in 
the form of both self-ratings and peer-ratings over the course 
of the multiyear study. There were up to three self-ratings 
and up to three peer-ratings of the SMM that could be used 
for each participant. 
We used indicators of two distinct traits from each Big 
Five domain selected to parallel the traits examined in 
Study 1 to the extent possible, and which were examined 
separately: the items bold and extraverted within the do-
main of extraversion; kind and cooperative in the domain 
of agreeableness; organized and practical in the domain of 
conscientiousness, fretful and temperamental in the domain 
of neuroticism, and creative and philosophical in the domain 
of openness. Self-rating estimates of these traits were formed 
by aggregating the multiple self-ratings of these items over 
the course of multiple years of the study; peer rating scales 
were formed by aggregating the 1 to 3 peer ratings. 
International Personality Item Pool (IPIP). ESCS participants 
completed up to 2,492 IPIP items between Spring, 1994 and 
Spring, 2003, which consisted of short items describing their 
behavioral traits, feelings, skills, beliefs, and more abstract 
self-perceptions.
The first and third authors and a research assistant cate-
gorized the IPIP items as either an FI item (e.g., abilities, be-
liefs, likes/dislikes, goals, values) or a behavioral trait item. For 
the 1,351 items classified as FIs, the item’s correlation with 
a self-reported and peer-reported SMM trait was first aver-
aged. We then identified the 100 FI items with the highest ab-
solute correlation with each SMM trait. Across the 10 traits, 
this resulted in a smaller set of 630 items. These items were 
then entered into a cluster analysis, which was prespecified 
to extract 75 clusters. These clusters ranged in size from 24 
items, to a one-item cluster which was not considered fur-
ther. For the remaining 74 clusters, we selected a single item 
to represent in Table 4 which was most representative of how 
the cluster was associated with the 10 traits. 
Results and Discussion
Question 1: What FIs are associated with behavioral 
traits in the same Big Five domain? We first examined FIs 
associated with traits regarded as being within the same trait 
domain. In the text, we only discuss items that were both (a) 
correlated at least | r| = .20 with either self-ratings or peer-
ratings of both traits, and (b) significantly correlated with 
both self- and peer-ratings of these traits. We entered these 
items into a cluster analysis to organize redundancies, and 
in the text identify the resulting groups by their item num-
bers in Table 4. 
Bold and extraverted. We found 11 items associated with 
both traits, in roughly three clusters. The first (#1, #6, #10, 
#13, #16, #18) consisted largely of reported ease of influenc-
ing others, expressing feelings, and approaching others. The 
second (#2, #12) consisted of enjoyment of power and atten-
tion. The third (#7, #48) consisted of reported ease of making 
Table 3. Relations Between Self- and Peer-Rated Big Five-Related Trait Perceptions
# Trait      αS           αP              1             2             3        4              5             6              7     8          9             10
1 bold .76 .43 .54 .49 –.06 –.10 .07 –.05 –.14 .15 .14 .07
2 extraverted .85 .53 .45 .54 .09 .08 .06 –.03 –.10 .00 .14 .07
3 kind .66 .27 .04 .12 .23 .47 .09 .21 –.09 –.36 .07 .10
4 cooperative .62 .35 –.02 .12 .52 .20 .22 .30 –.21 –.45 .09 .17
5 organized .86 .57 .09 .07 .10 .16 .50 .38 –.13 –.09 .05 .04
6 practical .72 .45 .04 –.04 .17 .34 .38 .30 –.23 –.26 –.07 .09
7 fretful .72 .43 –.08 –.06 –.09 –.12 –.13 –.13 .30 .35 –.04 –.11
8 temperamental .77 .48 .07 –.01 –.22 –.29 –.15 –.19 .44 .37 .05 –.16
9 creative .85 .52 .29 .20 .15 .12 .05 .08 –.11 –.07 .44 .25
10 philosophical .81 .49 .10 .09 .12 .09 –.01 .05 –.02 –.07 .31 .42
N ≥ 590. αS = Alpha from self-ratings, αP = Estimated alpha from peer-ratings. All |rs| ≥ .08 are statistically significant (p < .05), 
all |rs| ≥ .20 are additionally shown in bold. Correlations between self-ratings are shown below the diagonal, and correlations 
between peer-ratings are shown above the diagonal. Correlations between the self-rating and peer-rating for the same item are 
shown on the diagonal and italicized.
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decisions without concern of embarrassment. Somewhat in-
dependently, individuals who believed they were important 
(#4) and attractive (#15), and who looked forward to oppor-
tunities to learn and grow (#69) tended to be both more bold 
and extraverted.
Kind and cooperative. We identified five items associated with 
both traits. Four (#19, #20, #21, #24) pertained to feeling it 
was important and enjoyable to help others, and the latter con-
cerned a tendency to see the positive side of situations (#57).
Organized and practical. We identified five items associ-
ated with both traits. Three (#30, #34, #39) pertained to ease 
of staying organized and maintain resources. Somewhat dis-
tinctly, individuals who disliked themselves (#42) and who 
did not think planning was important (#31) tended to be 
both less organized and practical.
Fretful and temperamental. We identified 10 items associated 
with both traits, in roughly two clusters. The first (#41, #42, 
#44, #57, #49) concerned disliking oneself and feeling disliked 
by others. The second (#43, #50) pertained to concerns about 
health. Somewhat distinctly, both were associated with ease of 
being annoyed (#58) and of resisting temptations (#59).
Creative and philosophical. We identified eight items asso-
ciated with both traits, in roughly two clusters. The first (#1, 
#5, #61, #66, #72) largely concerned interest in and ease of 
solving complex, theoretical, or novel problems. The second 
(#62, #67, #69) largely concerned desires to learn about one-
self and to grow and develop.
Question 2: What FIs are associated with traits in di-
verse trait domains? Similar to Study 1, we next identified 
FI items that were correlated at a | r| ≥ .10 level with traits 
in several Big Five domains simultaneously. 
Negative beliefs about oneself, others, and the future. Tenden-
cies to dislike oneself and feel unimportant (#4, #41, #42, 
#45) were most associated with neurotic tendencies, but were 
also associated with lower levels of nearly every other trait 
examined. Items indicating negative expectations about oth-
ers (#44, #53, #55) and the future (#29, #46, #57) showed 
similar associations.
Self-regulatory skills. Similar to Study 1, individuals who re-
ported greater ease of organizing and completing tasks (#7, 
#32, #34, #35) were particularly more organized, but were also 
more practical, bold, extraverted, and less fretful, both in self- 
and peer-reports, and described themselves as more coop-
erative, creative, and philosophical, and less temperamental.
Interpersonal skills. Similar to Study 1, individuals who 
reported skills at expressing and understanding themselves 
and others (#16, #17, #18, #23, #49) were more extraverted, 
bold, kind, and creative in both self- and peer-reports, and 
also described themselves as less fretful and temperamental 
and more philosophical.
Valuation of traditions. Similar to Study 1, people who dis-
liked rules and routines (#28, #65) and were unconcerned 
with being considered “strange” (#74), were more bold, cre-
ative, philosophical, and less kind, cooperative, organized, 
or practical, in both self- and peer-reports.
Question 3: What FIs are associated with uncorrelated or 
weakly correlated traits? As in Study 1, we were interested 
in illustrating how negligibly correlated traits can share com-
mon FIs in a suppressive manner. We returned to roughly 
the same trait-pairs examined in Study 1, and only discuss 
FIs that were significantly associated with either self-ratings 
or peer-ratings of both traits.
Organized and fretful. As in Study 1, there were several FIs 
with same-sign correlations with both traits. Tendencies to 
want order (#33) and to be upset with disorder (#56) were 
associated with being both more orderly and fretful, while 
enjoying danger (#26), variety (#65), and being unconcerned 
with dressing nicely (#27) were associated with both being 
less orderly and less fretful. However, other FIs showed op-
posite-sign correlations. Individuals who disliked themselves 
and were suspicious of others (#41, #42, #44, #45, #55), who 
had difficulties handling interpersonal and complex situa-
tions (#5, #16, #18), and who found it difficult to start and 
stay focused on tasks (#32, #34, #35, #36) tended to be less 
organized and more fretful.
Bold and cooperative. As in Study 1, reported abilities to 
do difficult or novel tasks (#18, #32, #35, #49, #51) and to 
express and understand emotions (#16, #17, #23, #62) were 
positively associated with both traits; and feelings that life, 
others, or oneself were dislikable or without value (#4, #15, 
#29, #41, #42, #45) were negatively associated. However, 
enjoying danger (#3, #26) and disliking conformity, rules, 
and routine (#9, #28, #65, #68, #74) was associated with in-
creased boldness but decreased cooperativeness.
Summary of the Empirical Illustrations
As noted at the onset, a major goal of the empirical illus-
trations was to yield a more empirically grounded specifi-
cation of Figure 1B, that is: of the FIs that may be involved 
with shaping levels of many distinct behavioral traits simul-
taneously. Consequently, we conclude these illustrations by 
identifying 22 specific FIs which appeared to both (a) be rel-
atively similar across the two studies, and (b) relate to trait 
perceptions in a relatively similar manner in Tables 2 and 
4. These are presented in Figure 2. For instance, “ability to 
imagine things” was positively associated with assertive-
ness, sociability, warmth, politeness, and negatively associ-
ated with anxiety in both studies (#78 in Table 2, #66 in Ta-
ble 4). These items were cluster analyzed using the relevant 
items from Study 1 in order to place more highly covarying 
items closer together in the figure; this suggested these 22 FIs 
could be organized in roughly five clusters. 
This diagram illustrates some important overarching 
themes from the two empirical illustrations. First, traits in a 
common trait domain seemed to covary due to the sharing of 
numerous distinct FIs. For instance, the present results sug-
gest that assertiveness and sociability covary in part because 
both traits are similarly facilitated by FIs such as liking atten-
tion, and social situations; by the ease of opening up to oth-
ers, and of adapting to new situations; and by expectations 
that interactions with others will go well. Many of these FIs 
are relatively distinct from one another and thus should ex-
plain independent aspects of the covariation between asser-
tiveness and sociability. Second, we found that associations 
between a particular FI and trait perceptions were rarely lo-
calized to a single Big Five domain. Rather, FIs regularly had 
associations across multiple trait domains simultaneously. 
Third, even those FIs that had higher semantic and statistical 
similarity to one another (as indicated here by being on the 
same cluster) had distinguishable associations with trait per-
ceptions that were relatively consistent across the two stud-
ies. For instance, “liking to attract attention” and “liking be-
ing considered odd/strange” might be considered as being 
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fairly similar, but the former had positive associations with 
sociability not found with the latter, and the latter had nega-
tive associations with orderliness not found with the former.
It is also reassuring to find that the relationships between 
particular FIs and Big Five-related traits seemed to gener-
ally be similar to relationships identified previously in the 
literature. For instance, Connor-Smith and Flachsbart (2007) 
reported that the ability to cognitively restructure negative 
events was associated with more positive levels of all Big 
Five traits, a finding paralleled here (#74, #75, #20 in Table 
2; #23, #57 in Table 4). Similarly, Wood, Harms, and Vazire 
(2010) found tendencies to see others positively to be asso-
ciated with more positive levels of traits in all Big Five do-
mains, a finding paralleled here (#24, #29, #96 in Table 2; 
#44, #53, #55 in Table 4). 
An important caveat of these empirical illustrations is that 
the documented relationships between FIs and behavioral 
traits have to indicate causal relationships—with FIs caus-
ally impacting behavioral trait levels—in order for FIs to ex-
plain trait variation and covariation in the manner concep-
tually described here (Figure 1B). The cross-sectional nature 
of the two explorations makes it impossible to definitively 
establish the directionality of these relationships. However, 
it would be very surprising if the associations documented 
in Tables 2 and 4 represented mainly noncausal effects of FIs 
on behavioral traits for several reasons. 
First, a diverse range of theoretical models posit FIs as 
the proximal causes of an individual’s behavior (e.g., Ajzen, 
1991; Feather, 1982; Gintis, 2007; Mischel & Shoda, 1995). 
These associations appear to be generally consistent with 
the overarching functionality assumption that FIs relate to 
behavioral tendencies by how they alter the behavior’s as-
sociation to desired ends. For instance, it is easy to imagine 
how a “belief that rudeness is socially acceptable” would de-
crease the perceived costs of behaving in an assertive, un-
kind, and irritable manner, and shape levels of these behav-
ioral tendencies accordingly. Second, it is increasingly clear 
that cross-sectional relationships between FIs and behav-
ioral traits frequently replicate in within-person studies, or 
when the associated FIs are directly manipulated (Dweck & 
Leggett, 1988; Fleeson, Malanos, & Achille, 2002; Higgins, 
2000; McCabe & Fleeson, 2012; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). 
Third, behaviors, abilities, expectancies, motives, and as-
sociated life experiences appear to generally reinforce and 
show “corresponsive” causal relationships with one another 
(Denissen, Zarrett, & Eccles, 2007; Roberts & Wood, 2006). 
On the basis of these numerous considerations, we believe 
that our base expectation should be that the correlational re-
lationships identified here generally indicate causal effects 
of FIs on the behavioral traits they are associated with. At 
the very least, these represent a myriad of sensible “empir-
ically informed hypotheses” regarding the various FIs that 
Figure 2. The left half of the diagram depicts some of the FIs found to relate to Big Five-related traits in a similar fashion in both 
Studies 1 and 2. Subscripts indicate where the corresponding FIs are listed in Tables 2 and 4, respectively. Solid lines indicate posi-
tive effects, and dashed lines indicate negative effects. The right-half of the diagram, adapted from Wood (in press), depicts a con-
ception of the Big Five structural factors as “useful summaries” of ways in which an individual’s traits impact relationship deci-
sions regarding the individual made by others (e.g., whether to befriend or begin a romantic relationship with the individual). See 
Footnote 1 regarding how to interpret relations between behavioral traits and trait perceptions (e.g., assertiveness, sociability) and 
broader structural factors (e.g., extraversion). 
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may be further explored as sources of Big Five-related be-
havioral traits and trait perceptions. 
Broader Implications of a Functionalist Understanding  
of Trait Covariation
The framework we have illustrated is a fairly different ap-
proach to the issue of trait covariation than is typically seen 
in personality psychology, where covariation is sometimes 
considered to be “explained” by a small number of factors 
identified in structural investigations (e.g., the Big Five or 
HEXACO factors). We will thus continue by first discussing 
how structural factors such as the Big Five might be consid-
ered as linking with the current functionalist understanding 
of trait covariation. Then, we will discuss some implications 
of this manner of understanding the sources of behavioral 
trait levels for additional topics within personality psychol-
ogy, such as trait stability and trait measurement.
Locating Structural Factors in the Personality System
Within the empirical illustrations, our goal was to argue 
that functionalist or process units such as expectancies, self-
efficacies, values and goals can be enlisted to explain the co-
variation of traits such as assertiveness and sociability. We 
did not directly address the issue of how structural factors 
such as the Big Five might link to this understanding of trait 
covariation. We consider four different perspectives which 
may be compatible with the empirical illustrations.
Structural factors as approximating “distal causes” of 
process variables. A first manner in which we might try to 
locate structural factors in a functionalist framework is as 
major causes of FIs and process variables. This view under-
stands structural factors as approximating more distal causes 
of FIs or process variables, which in turn mediate the effects 
of structural factors on behavior.
This appears to be a fairly common understanding of 
structural factors, as evidenced by how relations between 
structural factors and behavior are often described in the 
literature. To illustrate with recent examples: Duckitt and 
Sibley (2009) considered the belief that some groups are su-
perior to others as “ deriving directly from the personality di-
mension of Tough versus Tendermindedness (in Big-Five 
terms, low Agreeableness)” (p. 102); Chan and Drasgow 
(2001) argued that Big Five traits “relate to leader behaviors 
through the individual’s motivation to lead, which in turn 
affects the individual’s participation in leadership roles ” 
(p. 481; also Judge, Piccolo, & Kosalka, 2009). Most directly, 
Terracciano and McCrae (2012) argued that “it is perfectly 
reasonable to say that party going is caused (proximally) by 
liking people and that it is caused (distally) by extraversion” 
(p. 449; italics added in examples above). This view is par-
ticularly reflected within Five Factor Theory, where process 
variables are considered “characteristic adaptations” shaped 
largely by the five factors measured by the NEO-PI, which 
are considered “basic tendencies” (see McCrae & Costa, 2008, 
Figure 5.1). 
An appealing aspect of this conception of structural fac-
tors is that it provides some suggestions regarding how lev-
els of FIs or process variables are themselves shaped. How-
ever, there are considerable questions as to the specific 
nature of these more distal causes. One possibility is that 
structural factors might approximate set-points or sources of 
equilibrium within the personality system. As suggested by 
DeYoung (2014) structural factors such as the Big Five may 
approximate “persistent attractor states . . . [which] indicate 
states toward which the person will tend to gravitate” (p. 3; 
McCrae, 2009). Like an individual’s center of gravity, this 
may not be a property of the individual we can hope to di-
rectly observe, but which helps to understand the individ-
ual’s behavior. As more distal sources of behavior, we may 
however suspect structural factors as having stronger asso-
ciations with particular biological systems than FIs. For in-
stance, DeYoung (2006) has suggested that the plasticity and 
stability “metatraits” that may exist above the Big Five may 
have substantial correspondence to the dopaminergic or se-
rotonergic systems, respectively. 
Structural factors as “causally efficacious composites.” 
A second perspective is suggested by Meehl’s (1993) under-
standing that “a mathematical factor can correspond to a 
causally efficacious composite whose elements are qualita-
tively unlike” (p. 4). In other words, a structural factor may 
not correspond to a particularly unitary thing, but rather be 
better interpreted as something like “the sum of the diverse 
things which cause the measured traits to covary.” 
For instance, a “plasticity” or “Beta” dimension is some-
times thought to underlie the covariation between the extra-
version and openness/intellect factors (DeYoung, 2006; Dig-
man, 1997; Markon, Krueger, & Watson, 2005; but see Ashton 
et al., 2009). However, if we examine the specific content of 
IPIP items that have the highest loadings on this broader 
Plasticity factor, as reported in DeYoung, 2010, Table 1, we 
see that many of these are FIs of the sort considered here. (In-
deed, because both our list of FIs in Study 2 and DeYoung’s, 
2010 list of plasticity and stability indicators are IPIP items, 
some of these are exactly the same items.) For instance, some 
items concern descriptions of social skills (e.g., “have a nat-
ural talent for influencing people;” “express myself easily”), 
others concern the desire for attention (e.g., “don’t mind be-
ing the center of attention”) and others an interest in self-de-
velopment (e.g., “look forward to the opportunity to learn 
and grow”). From this perspective, the diverse FIs found 
to load most on this factor may not be indicators of some 
deeper plasticity, but may instead indicate some of the more 
important, relatively distinct processes that cause the asso-
ciated traits to covary. In fact, it may be in part the fact that 
qualitatively different processes such as these explain inde-
pendent parts of the covariation of the associated traits which 
causes these processes to receive high factor loadings, anal-
ogous to how variables retain nonzero weights in a simul-
taneous regression. More generally, any FI or process vari-
able that is strongly associated with a structural factor should 
usually be expected to be important for understanding why 
the narrower behavioral traits and trait perceptions associ-
ated with the factor covary. 
From this perspective, we could consider structural anal-
yses as guiding us to the locations of some of the specific FIs 
or process variables that are most important to explaining the 
observed covariation between traits. A functionalist approach 
such as that illustrated here might then be considered as de-
composing these “causally efficacious composites” into their 
more specific constituent elements (Johnson, 1999; Roberts, 
2009). A couple advantages should follow from this, which 
we can see in our empirical illustrations. First, we may see 
more clearly that FIs such as these and others contribute to the 
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covariation of traits within a given domain relatively indepen-
dently of one another. Additionally, by measuring these FIs 
separately rather than aggregating them into such a compos-
ite, we can see more clearly that they have distinct effects on 
traits in other domains. To use two of the characteristics just 
listed, we see that people who “look forward to the opportu-
nity to learn and grow” (#69 in Table 4) and “like to attract 
attention” (#12) tend to be higher on both extraversion and 
openness-related traits, as we should expect given that these 
IPIP items have among the highest loadings on a broader plas-
ticity factor (DeYoung, 2010; Table 1). However, these two FIs 
have slightly different effects outside of these trait domains—
specifically, “looking forward to learning/growth opportu-
nities” showed positive associations with emotional stability, 
kindness, and practicality, whereas “liking attention” showed 
negative associations with the same traits. These secondary 
relationships are both sensible and valuable to know, but are 
also largely masked when aggregated with many other items 
to measure a broader plasticity factor. 
Structural factors as useful summaries. Another inter-
pretation of structural factors is detailed by Ashton and Lee 
(2005), who argue that: 
We can explain decisiveness, cautiousness, studiousness, and 
practicality as manifestations of a more general construct of 
‘Conscientiousness’ . . . [but this] should not be misconstrued 
as a claim that these factors are causes of those characteris-
tics. That is, although we explain these characteristics as ex-
amples of the broader constructs represented by the factors, 
we do not explain the characteristics as consequences of those 
broader constructs” (p. 15; authors’ italics). 
Structural factors are understood more explicitly as de-
scriptive from this perspective than those described previ-
ously. Consequently, the explanatory power of invoking struc-
tural factors to explain specific traits is understood as roughly 
analogous to Funder’s (1991) understanding of the explana-
tory power of using trait attributions of specific behaviors, 
who notes “such an explanation relates a specific behavioral 
observation to a complex and general pattern of behavior” and 
in this manner serve as useful “stopping places in the explan-
atory regress” (p. 36). For instance, if we say “Ramona is or-
ganized because she is high on conscientiousness,” we are in 
effect saying “Ramona is organized because she is also cau-
tious, studious, and practical,” and we are thus learning that 
whatever processes commonly facilitate traits in the consci-
entiousness domain may be driving her organized behavior 
(Ashton & Lee, 2005; McCrae & Costa, 1995). Traits covary in 
part because they share environmental, biological, and func-
tional pathways, and as structural factors are effective sum-
maries of covariation, it may be prudent to consider the traits 
at the level of structural factors rather than the narrower traits 
in order to increase parsimony (Krueger, DeYoung, & Mar-
kon, 2010; Krueger & Markon, 2006). This resembles the most 
recent position of McCrae (2014), who suggests that viewing a 
structural factor as the sum (rather than the cause) of the nar-
rower facets, much as shown in Figures 1B and 2, “is most cer-
tainly not meaningless; it should allow inferences about other, 
extratest manifestations and correlates,” and elaborates that if 
the various facets relate to other outcomes in similar ways, the 
“facets may be legitimately combined because they are func-
tionally equivalent” (p. 12). 
Structural factors as particularly socially consequen-
tial traits. Finally, structural factors might be regarded as 
pieces of information which are particularly useful or important 
for perceivers to know about someone (Buss, 1996; Goldberg, 
1981; McAdams & Pals, 2006; Srivastava, 2010). Interestingly, 
this perspective understands structural factors as summa-
ries rather than as approximating sources of the individual’s 
behavior, but emphasizes that they may also be among the 
most important sources of others’ behavior toward the indi-
vidual. This view is depicted graphically in Figure 2. 
This understanding of the Big Five and HEXACO fac-
tors rests on the fact that lexical studies involve the analy-
sis of the most frequently used person descriptors in a given 
culture. From this perspective, the reason communal struc-
tural factors (e.g., agreeableness, conscientiousness) emerge 
prominently in lexical studies around the world (Ashton & 
Lee, 2007; Saucier & Goldberg, 2001) is because these corre-
lated tendencies are extremely consequential to a range of 
relationships in any human society, and members of a cul-
ture thus develop and use many words to describe them. Es-
timates of communal factors more generally indicate the ex-
tent to which individuals will prioritize their interests over 
the interests of others (Ashton & Lee, 2007; Wood, Tov, & 
Costello, in press), and this is extremely useful information 
to know about someone, regardless of the myriad processes 
which may cause the person to do so (Buss, 2008; Cottrell, 
Neuberg, & Li, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). In con-
trast, we have few words to describe tendencies to do activi-
ties left-handed versus right-handed (e.g., open doors, write, 
hold mugs, throw balls), and thus don’t have a “handed-
ness” factor in our trait structures. This is not because there 
is any more or less covariation between these behavioral 
tendencies, but because they are much less socially conse-
quential, and thus less represented in lexical trait structures 
(Goldberg & Saucier, 1995). 
As support for this interpretation, Wood (in press) found 
that trait terms with higher loadings on the Big Five dimen-
sions had a larger impact on others’ relationship decisions 
(e.g., whether to date or befriend someone) than terms with 
negligible loadings. Similarly, conscientiousness-related 
traits influence whether employers will hire, fire, or pro-
mote you, which is decidedly appropriate, as these behav-
ioral traits impact the overall productivity of their company 
(Barrick & Mount, 1991; Dudley, Orvis, Lebiecki, & Cortina, 
2006). Moreover, conscientiousness-related traits impact re-
lationship satisfaction and longevity (Bogg & Roberts, 2004; 
Ozer & Benet-Martínez, 2006; Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, Caspi, 
& Goldberg, 2007). These are also fairly clearly causal ef-
fects: if an individual’s rate of conscientious behavior were 
to become higher, his or her spouse’s satisfaction, organiza-
tion’s earnings, job standing, and own life expectancy would 
be expected to increase. Levels of conscientiousness-related 
traits could increase by impacting a range of distinct FIs—
one individual by becoming more concerned with making 
coworkers happy; a second by enjoying work more; a third 
by becoming more able to filter out distractions—and we 
might expect largely the same salutary effects. Their employ-
ers may in essence say “I don’t care why this employee be-
haves more conscientiously now, but this employee should 
receive a promotion.” As depicted in Figure 2, it will often 
be an individual’s behavioral tendencies which are the prox-
imal causes of others’ responses to the individual, not the 
processes that shaped them. The value of structural factors 
such as the Big Five or HEXACO factors as a level of analy-
sis may principally be their ability to summarize similarities 
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in how an individual’s traits tend to impact his or her inter-
personal environment. 
Jointly considering these perspectives.The four per-
spectives discussed above represent an incomplete survey 
of views regarding how structural factor and functional ex-
planations of behavior might be connected. However, there 
is little reason to think they need to be mutually exclusive. 
For instance, the axes of factors such as the Big Five will 
gravitate toward items that have the most correlations with 
other items. However, there are many reasons that a particu-
lar item will covary with many items in the set. It may do so 
because it closely indicates a variable which influences many 
conceptually different variables in the set. For instance, be-
ing secure in one’s self-worth (as indicated by adjectives like 
well-adjusted and secure, and related to #4, #41, and #42 in Ta-
ble 4) likely commonly facilitates extraverted, agreeable, con-
scientious, emotionally stable, and open behaviors. Alterna-
tively, an item may covary with many other items by being 
influenced by a qualitatively distinct variable that influences 
many others in the set but is not itself closely indicated in 
the analysis (e.g., functioning of the dopamine system, cur-
rent mood, a response set). Alternatively, a particular item 
will correlate with more items in a lexical set if many other 
conceptually similar items have been frontloaded into the set 
(e.g., many terms about warmth were entered into the anal-
ysis and few about handedness; Saucier & Goldberg, 1996). 
We have already described our preferred understanding 
of structural factors, which understands structural factors 
first and foremost as indicating the most socially valuable 
and consequential information about an individual’s be-
havioral tendencies, as depicted in Figure 2. However, even 
without shifting from this conception of structural factors, 
we can note that the most valuable traits for perceivers to 
learn about a person should not simply be the person’s most 
consequential behavioral tendencies, but the FIs or processes 
that lead the person to perform them. For instance, knowing 
whether an individual typically completes obligations and 
works hard (i.e., acts conscientiously) may be of great value 
to perceivers, but knowing whether the individual possesses 
self-regulatory skills and feels it is important to honor com-
mitments should be particularly useful toward predicting 
such behaviors. For these and other reasons, structural anal-
yses should simultaneously help to identify both the behav-
ioral tendencies that are of particular interest to perceivers 
and the FIs that are particularly important in shaping them. 
More generally, structural factors such as the Big Five 
may simultaneously indicate both the most important sources 
and outputs of the individual’s personality system (Fleeson, 
2012; McCabe & Fleeson, 2012). This could occur if the words 
individuals use most frequently to describe one another fol-
low a folk wisdom of encapsulating particularly important 
stages of an individual’s goal-directed action patterns, such 
as how they plan or initiate behaviors (DeYoung, 2014; Van 
Egeren, 2009). This is an interesting possibility to be evalu-
ated more fully in future research. 
The Value of Greater Disaggregation in Personality 
Measurement
Despite a general understanding that suppression effects 
are rare and difficult to find (e.g., Paulhus, Robins, Trzesn-
iewski, & Tracy, 2004), our results suggest that suppres-
sion effects are likely quite common: behavioral traits and 
abstract trait perceptions are regularly uncorrelated in part 
due to having some processes which increase their corre-
lation and others that decrease their correlation in roughly 
equal magnitude. Additionally, the model described here 
and illustrated in Figure 2 indicates that FIs or behavioral 
traits should not be considered manifestations of more ba-
sic factors such as extraversion. If structural factors do not 
approximate the most important common causes of trait co-
variation, the rationale for aggregating narrower traits to 
estimate them becomes somewhat weaker. The common 
practice of aggregating FIs and process variables with the 
behaviors they are most associated with makes it much more 
difficult to see the diverse effects a single FI regularly has on 
other behavioral traits. For instance, the common practice of 
aggregating items indicating orderliness concerns, orderli-
ness skills, and orderly behavior to estimate an individual’s 
broader orderliness or conscientiousness, would have made 
it more difficult to document the opposing effects of order-
liness concerns and orderliness skills on anxiety and irrita-
bility levels that we found in both studies. 
More generally, although factors such as the Big Five 
represent useful ways of summarizing an individual’s traits 
which impact other outcomes in similar ways, it should be a 
rare circumstance when all the traits used to identify a struc-
tural factor are equally related with any particular outcome 
of interest. Consequently, the practice of aggregating a large 
number of correlated traits into an estimate of a single struc-
tural factor prior to explore their correlations with other vari-
ables of interest will generally result in a considerable loss of 
information that is reliable and theoretically meaningful (Mc-
Crae, 2014). For instance, although extraversion measures are 
sometimes regarded as having negligible or inconsistent rela-
tionships with gender (Feingold, 1994; Lynn & Martin, 1997), 
narrower traits in the domain of extraversion have stronger 
and more consistent relationships: measures related to asser-
tiveness tends to be higher among men, whereas measures 
related to warmth and positive affectivity tend to be higher 
among women (Costa, Terracciano, & McCrae, 2001; Wood, 
Nye, & Saucier, 2010). 
Given the frequency with which structural factors have 
been the preferred level of analysis in personality psychol-
ogy, it is still surprisingly easy to make important contribu-
tions to the field by simply showing how very basic variables 
(e.g., gender, age, political orientation, health, popularity, 
intelligence, attractiveness) are associated with personality 
traits measured at a more fine-grained level of analysis. For 
instance, Soto, John, Gosling, and Potter (2011) recently dem-
onstrated that simply shifting the level of analysis from the 
broader Big Five factors to 10 narrower dimensions consid-
erably refined the picture of how personality changes with 
age as reported elsewhere (Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 
2006; Srivastava, John, Gosling, & Potter, 2003). Although lev-
els of the broad structural factor conscientiousness increase 
considerably in adulthood, these increases seem to be largely 
localized to traits related to self-discipline, whereas traits re-
lated to orderliness seem to increase negligibly (see also Jack-
son et al., 2009). 
How Are Levels of Functionality Indicators Shaped?
As we have argued, FIs should be expected to be true 
causes of behavioral trait levels, in that individuals should 
gravitate toward behavioral trait levels that they experience as 
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having greater functionality. Consequently, much of the value 
of identifying important FIs is in giving us a list of variables 
we should target to influence behavioral trait levels. However, 
we have mostly not discussed the issue of how these FIs might 
be influenced. Additionally, we have focused principally on 
explaining covariation of behavioral traits, but it is clear that 
conceptually distinct FIs or process variables show consider-
able correlations with one another (e.g., positive social expec-
tations, positive social skills, and liking social interactions).
In the same way that a single behavioral trait should be 
understood as being shaped by several distinct FIs, a single 
FI should be understood as being shaped by a large number 
of distinct forces. Some of these will include predictable in-
fluences of FIs on one another; for instance, if an individual 
increases in their desire to attain a particular goal, the indi-
vidual can be expected to increase in their ability to do so, 
and vice versa (Bandura, 1986; Denissen et al., 2007; Lent, 
Brown, & Hackett, 1994). The causal effects of the ability, 
expectancy, and valuation trait classes on one another can 
be understood through the same overarching functionality 
assumption that links these three trait classes to behavioral 
traits (Wood & Denissen, in press). There should be pressure 
for any trait to increase—whether it is a behavioral trait or an 
FI—when the actor experiences a higher level of this trait to 
be functional. For instance, it is generally functional to de-
crease one’s valuation of tasks you are unable to perform 
(Baltes, 2003; Heckhausen, Wrosch, & Schulz, 2010), and to 
find it more difficult or taxing to perform actions that you 
find unrewarding (Kurzban, Duckworth, Kable, & Myers, 
2013). Such functional dynamics will frequently lead concep-
tually distinct FIs to be correlated with one another and con-
sequently can help to explain some of the syndromal quali-
ties found in personality networks. 
Additionally, an individual’s levels of FIs should be 
shaped by features of the individual’s biology and culture 
(Mischel & Shoda, 1995), or of the objective situation more 
generally (Reis, 2008). For instance, an individual’s general 
tendency to see other people positively, which is likely in-
volved in influencing levels of many distinct behavioral traits, 
might itself be influenced in predictable ways by environ-
mental and biological factors ranging from physical attrac-
tiveness (Langlois et al., 2000), to the level of amygdala activa-
tion to happy faces (Omura, Todd Constable, & Canli, 2005), 
the number of recent positive or negative events (Vaidya, 
Gray, Haig, & Watson, 2002), and the degree of parental af-
fection (Collins & Read, 1994), among many other things. As 
with the effects of FIs on one another, the effects of biologi-
cal and experiential variables on FIs can be understood as be-
ing mediated by altering the functionality of the FI itself. For 
instance, it is somewhat more functional to perceive others 
negatively if local rates of infectious disease are high (Schaller 
& Murray, 2010), and children are more likely to develop in-
tellectual abilities when in familial or cultural environments 
that place greater value on such skills (Nisbett et al., 2012). 
Implications for Understanding Trait Change and 
Stability
Sometimes the considerable heritability estimates and 
rank-order stability estimates of structural factors (e.g., 
Bouchard, 2004; Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000), and indications 
of relatively small environmental effects on the development 
of broad personality factors (Neyer & Asendorpf, 2001; Neyer 
& Lehnart, 2007; Specht, Egloff, & Schmukle, 2011) are offered 
as evidence that such factors are basic tendencies that are rela-
tively impervious to change (Eysenck, 1970; McCrae & Costa, 
2008). However, there is actually surprisingly little evidence 
that structural factors are either more heritable or more stable 
than the narrower traits they summarize. Once a trait mea-
sure’s instability over very short periods of time (e.g., 1 or 2 
weeks) is accounted for, narrow traits appear to show heri-
tability and stability estimates that may be comparable with 
broader structural factors (McCrae, Kurtz, Yamagata, & Ter-
racciano, 2011, Table 2; Wood & Wortman, 2012). Nor is it 
clear that higher levels of these characteristics necessarily in-
dicate that they are more “basic.” For instance, Johnson, Mc-
Gue, Krueger, and Bouchard (2004) reported the heritability 
of marital status to be on par with the heritabilities of per-
sonality traits, despite the fact that one’s likelihood of marry-
ing is undoubtedly influenced by a variety of distinct traits. 
A functionalist understanding of trait variation and co-
variation suggests some reasons to be both more and less 
optimistic about the possibility of large-scale personality 
change. First, the apparent resistance of personality traits to 
environmental influence has likely been artificially inflated 
by the aggregation of behavioral traits with distinct etiolo-
gies into estimates of structural factors. For instance, a partic-
ular assertiveness training program could indeed result in in-
creased levels of assertiveness, but have negligible effects on 
other traits in the extraversion domain, such as positive affect 
or activity level, and even negative effects on others such as 
sociability. If evaluators of this program were to search for 
effects of the intervention on “personality traits” at the level 
of structural factors, this effect will be diluted if not washed 
out entirely, and the researchers may be misled to the con-
clusion that the intervention “does not impact personality 
traits” when there are in fact several reliable effects of the in-
tervention on specific behavioral traits and FIs. As a single 
Big Five scale is a summary of a broad range of distinct traits, 
the entire scale score should not shift much from some expe-
rience unless the experience impacts most of the narrower 
traits contained within the scale and in the same direction. 
Measuring distinct behavioral traits separately should thus 
be expected to result in more frequent observation of envi-
ronmental effects on trait development.
However, the current findings also suggest at least two 
reasons to be more pessimistic about the possibility of large-
scale changes in behavioral traits. First, although the current 
findings suggest some of the FIs or process variables we may 
target to increase levels of the behavioral trait, levels of these 
FIs will not be infinitely malleable. Rather, each is certain to 
be highly influenced by numerous biological or environmen-
tal variables, which will often themselves be very stable over 
time. As one example, many of the FIs shown in Tables 2 and 
4 show considerable associations with self-reported sex. Fe-
males reported greater skill at understanding others’ feel-
ings (#23 in Table 4, Cohen’s d = .72) than males, and lower 
tendency to “love a good fight” (#26, d = −.49). As an indi-
vidual’s biological sex impacts a number of FIs and doesn’t 
2. This adjustment is necessary to adjust for the fact that heritability and longitudinal stability estimates will be higher for scales with more items, 
all other things being equal. Further, as reviewed by McCrae et al. (2011), short test–retest stability (or “dependability”) estimates are likely more 
conceptually appropriate corrections for unreliability than interitem reliabilities. 
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change, it will effectively function as a consistent force on the 
associated FIs over time (mediated more proximally by its 
effects on testosterone, gender role expectations, and so on). 
Although this is an extreme case, many other biological and 
environmental variables (e.g., weight, brain integrity, physi-
cal attractiveness, regional culture, social class) will be suffi-
ciently stable over time to serve similar anchoring functions 
for the FIs that influence behavioral traits. 
Second, although these findings illuminate many of the 
functional levers that might be pushed or pulled to influ-
ence behavioral trait levels, a second reason to be pessimis-
tic about the possibility of large-scale changes is that there 
are so many of them. In Tables 2 and 4 and the surrounding 
discussion, we describe many of the distinct FIs that likely 
contribute relatively independently to behavioral trait lev-
els. And as we have noted, there will be numerous distinct 
biological and environmental features involved in calibrat-
ing levels of any particular FI. When there are many distinct 
determinants of a single behavior, the magnitude of the ef-
fect expected to occur by changing any one of them should 
be small (Ahadi & Diener, 1989). For instance, we might ex-
pect that an individual who has suddenly inculcated a de-
sire to become more sociable might observe little change in 
his or her levels of sociability if this change is not also ac-
companied by some combination of greater expectations of 
having positive social interactions, newfound social skills, 
enjoyment of attention and social interactions, or interest in 
others’ perspectives. 
The Issue of Parsimony
The functional conception of the sources of trait covaria-
tion and the exploratory goals of our present empirical illus-
trations together resulted in our unusual decision to aggre-
gate items as minimally as possible (see also Cramer et al., 
2012, 2010). We believe this to be a logical extension of func-
tionalist frameworks, in that these understand trait levels 
to be shaped by the value of their expected effects (Feather, 
1982; Thorndike, 1913), and understand any given trait to 
have a wide range of effects on the environment (e.g., Krug-
lanski et al., 2002). Additionally, we believe it has been valu-
able in providing within Tables 2 and 4 a much elaborated 
understanding of how levels of Big Five-related traits tend 
to relate to standard process variables such as self-efficacies, 
expectancies, goals, and contingencies of liking and anxiety. 
This in turn should help deepen the continuing integration of 
prominent trait and process approaches to personality (Flee-
son, 2012; Funder, 2001; Mischel, 2009). 
However, it may be argued that this approach to covaria-
tion is not as parsimonious as explanations involving struc-
tural factors. To illustrate: Whereas our findings suggest that 
the covariation of assertiveness and sociability is explained 
by at least half a dozen relatively distinct FIs or more, the 
Five Factor Model purports to explain the covariation of as-
sertiveness, sociability, and at least four other distinct traits 
(activity, excitement-seeking, positive emotionality, and 
warmth) largely via the single variable of extraversion (Mc-
Crae & Costa, 2008). This type of reasoning is described by 
Krueger, DeYoung, and Markon (2010) in their critique of a 
network model recently proposed by Cramer et al. (2012), 
which is similar in terms of its item-level analysis strategy 
and very large number of distinct components: 
With regard to model fit, the network models proposed by Cra-
mer et al. are unlikely to emerge as optimal models when com-
pared to latent variable [that is, structural factor] models. This is 
because the network models fit by Cramer et al. contain a mul-
titude of parameters; they are lacking in parsimony when com-
pared with latent variable models. Models lacking in parsimony 
often provide a poor relative fit to data and are thereby lower 
in scientific utility because they amount to little more than re-
expressions of observed data (p. 164).
We might agree with Krueger et al. that structural factor ex-
planations of trait covariation look much more parsimonious 
than network or functional explanations. For instance, com-
pare Figure 2 of Krueger and Markon (2006) with our Figure 
2, or with Cramer et al.’s Figure 2. As Krueger and colleagues 
note, standard psychometric tools for judging relative parsi-
mony (e.g., goodness-of-fit statistics) will almost undoubtedly 
judge most structural models to be more parsimonious than 
models such as what we have described here. But are they? 
As noted by Dawkins (2005) “parsimony is always in the fore-
front of a scientist’s mind when choosing between theories, 
but it isn’t always obvious how to judge it” (p. 118). 
How parsimonious are structural explanations? As we 
have reviewed, the level of parsimony associated with struc-
tural factor explanations depends in large part in how we 
should regard the nature of the relationship between struc-
tural factors and behavior. If structural factors such as extra-
version truly approximate the most important distal sources 
of FIs or process variables, then explanations of covariation 
by structural factors might be considered very parsimoni-
ous indeed. However, as we have discussed, there are many 
perspectives regarding what structural factors actually cor-
respond to.
Interestingly, theorists sometimes suggest that structural 
factors correspond roughly to important FIs or process vari-
ables. For instance, an individual’s level of extraversion may 
correspond highly to his or her valuation of reward stimuli 
(Ashton, Lee, & Paunonen, 2002; Denissen & Penke, 2008; 
Watson & Clark, 1997), which in turn might be associated 
with the dopaminergic system (e.g., DeYoung, 2010). Alter-
natively, such factors might be best viewed as “causally effi-
cacious composites” in which several fairly distinct FIs con-
tribute independently to the explanation of covariation. In 
both of these scenarios, it is ultimately FIs which are explain-
ing trait covariation (e.g., the extravert is going to parties 
because she more highly values social experiences). In this 
sense, structural analyses may point the way to FIs that is 
particularly important to explaining trait covariation, rather 
than point to a distinct sort of explanatory variable. 
The level of parsimony afforded by structural factor ex-
planations of covariation is of course even more dubious if 
we consider an individual’s level of a structural factor to 
be primarily a summary of the indicated traits. As noted 
by Borsboom and colleagues (Borsboom, Kievit, Cervone, & 
Hood, 2009; Cramer et al., 2012), if considered in this fashion 
an individual’s level of some structural factor like Extraver-
sion should be regarded as caused by levels of more specific 
tendencies to be assertive, sociable, and so on—in the sense 
of being a mathematical summary—and it is simply a cate-
gory error to “explain” covariation by the structural factor. 
Given the ambiguity of what structural factors are, and 
what they contribute to understanding behavior beyond 
functional or process variables, we would argue that it may 
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be functionalist approaches which eschew any distinct role to 
structural factors as sources of an individual’s more specific 
traits that are actually more parsimonious. Granted, this is a 
conceptual parsimony rather than a methodological one; there 
will undoubtedly be considerable growing pains as person-
ality psychologists and methodologists work to develop bet-
ter methods for representing the complex and massively in-
teracting networks of FIs or process variables that underlie 
an individual’s behaviors. However, this is work worth do-
ing, as understanding behavioral traits as being shaped by a 
large number of FIs rather than by a small number of struc-
tural factors could reflect a more accurate of the causal dy-
namics that underlie variation and covariation (Borsboom et 
al., 2009; Buss, 2008; Fleeson, 2012; Kurzban & Aktipis, 2007; 
Mischel & Shoda, 1995). Consequently, the upshot of learn-
ing to deal with this complexity will be a better understand-
ing of what traits are, and how trait levels are shaped. As 
noted by Minsky (2007): 
It might appear to make everything worse, to change some 
things that looked simple at first into problems that now seem 
more difficult. However, on a larger scale, this increase in 
complexity will actually make our job easier. For, once we 
split each old mystery into parts, we will have replaced each 
old, big problem with several new and smaller ones—each of 
which may still be hard but no longer seem unsolvable. (p. 2)
We believe that the large role structural factors have 
played in explanations of trait covariation may have in some 
ways served to slow our understanding of this phenome-
non. We may need to become more comfortable using a wide 
number of narrower process variables to explain trait covari-
ation. Decreasing the role of structural factors could help 
to remove a large cognitive and theoretical impediment to 
a more accurate understanding of trait covariation, similar 
to eliminating consideration of a singular homunculus as a 
source of our experience of consciousness in favor of models 
favoring a much larger network of narrower processes (Den-
nett, 1993; Kurzban & Aktipis, 2007; Minsky, 1988). 
Placing some limits on explanatory complexity. Func-
tionalist frameworks to covariation are consistent with net-
work approaches to understanding personality function-
ing that accommodate hundreds of interacting components 
(Cramer et al., 2012; Mischel & Shoda, 1995). Each distinct 
effect that might result from behavior, and separate valu-
ation of each effect, can be represented as a separate node 
in a personality network, and many of these should be ex-
pected to explain independent variance in a given behav-
ioral trait. As we have shown (e.g., Figure 2), this can result 
in a considerably more complex account of the sources of 
trait covariation than those found in a standard structural 
approaches. 
At the same time, recommending that a small number of 
structural factors be replaced with hundreds or even thou-
sands of items or variables to understand trait covariation 
can be meaningfully compared with recommending we as-
pire for the “great blooming, buzzing confusion” that James 
(1890, p. 488) described as an infant’s phenomenological ex-
perience before developing useful concepts for representing 
the world. This is not ultimately what we are recommending. 
Rather, as in the development of expertise (Ericsson & Lehm-
ann, 1996), achieving a mature and useful understanding 
of a phenomenon involves reducing many molecular pieces 
of information into more molar “chunks,” and drawing out 
more general principles (Funder, 1991). 
It is thus useful to briefly review some of the various steps 
that were taken here to reduce explanatory complexity at the 
level of FIs (see also S1 in the Supplementary Materials). We 
began with initial sets of 463 and 1,351 items in Studies 1 and 
2, respectively, which were correlated with measures of Big 
Five-related trait perceptions. However, cluster analysis was 
then used to group items that (a) related similarly to one an-
other, and (b) related similarly to trait perceptions, and re-
duce these to a single row in Tables 2 and 4. For instance, 
“concern for order” and “organization skills” are highly cor-
related with one another, but these distinctions were teased 
apart in both studies by relating differently to anxiety-related 
traits. However, distinctions such as “feeling uncomfortable 
around disorder” and “feeling stressed when there is not a 
plan” were initially measured as separate items, but were 
collapsed by the same considerations. Interestingly, these 
steps paralleled some of those that were used in the develop-
ment of Block’s diverse Q-sort instruments (see Block, 1961). 
As in that context, these steps lend themselves to a greater 
number of scales or components than reduction techniques 
like factor analysis which mainly prioritize interitem corre-
lations, but also provide an effective limit to the level of ex-
planatory complexity that will be tolerated in the analysis. 
At a more theoretical level, a functionalist framework fur-
ther reduces explanatory complexity in a couple ways. First, 
it provides a classification scheme for different aspects of a 
personality system. Rather than considering each item sepa-
rately (Cramer et al., 2012), these can be conceptually classi-
fied into the three classes of FIs—abilities/efficacies, expec-
tancies, and valuations—or as behavioral traits and more 
abstract trait perceptions. These trait classes can be used to 
reliably classify items in personality scales (e.g., “I like . . .” 
statements are valuation indicators; “I easily . . .” statements 
are ability indicators). More importantly, the way in which 
FIs should relate to behavioral patterns are articulated in 
a range of expectancy-value, rational actor, and economic 
models (e.g., Almlund et al., 2011; Feather, 1982; Gintis, 2007; 
Vroom, 1964). Specifically, FIs should influence behavioral 
trait levels principally by influencing their functionality. This 
overarching idea, which we have referred to as the function-
ally assumption, serves as a parsimonious theoretical guide as 
to when we should expect to observe associations between 
FIs and behavioral traits (or between nodes in a personality 
network) and when we should not. 
We believe this assumption holds up extremely well in 
our empirical illustrations. Specifically, it is difficult to iden-
tify clear cases within the hundreds of correlations listed in 
Tables 2 and 4 where behavioral traits were higher among 
individuals who found it more effortful or difficult to per-
form trait-identifying behaviors, or among those who had 
a greater expectation of negative outcomes of such behav-
iors. Rather, we suspect the specific positive, negative, and 
nonsignificant associations observed between FIs and behav-
ioral traits generally appear sensible and nonsurprising to 
most readers, due mainly to their own fairly intuitive ap-
plication of this functionalist assumption. For instance, to 
predict sociable behavioral tendencies to be positively cor-
related with the expectation that others are unkind would 
likely strike most people as absurd, principally because it 
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typically becomes less (rather than more) functional to so-
cialize if one has such expectations. More generally, whereas 
both network and structural approaches to covariation are 
at their heart mathematical modeling techniques, function-
alist approaches at their heart suggest how the content of 
such networks should be organized. As more work is done 
to detail how this functionality assumption can be more ex-
plicitly formalized, we expect that it will serve as a power-
ful guide for understanding the structure of complex per-
sonality networks. 
Conclusion 
The fact that distinct personality traits covary with one 
another has been suggested as a major rationale for casting 
structural factors such as the Big Five or HEXACO factors as 
“underlying” or “explaining” trait covariation (Cattell, 1950; 
McCrae & Costa, 1995; Tellegen, 1991). However, such ex-
planations are sometimes considered problematic by propo-
nents of process approaches, due in part to concerns of cir-
cularity and the question of how structural factors should be 
operationalized outside of their indicators (Bandura, 1999; 
Cervone, 1999; Cramer et al., 2012; Mischel, 1968). We illus-
trate here how the ability/efficacy, expectancy, and valua-
tion trait classes common to a range of functionalist and pro-
cess approaches—which we have considered here primarily 
as functionality indicators or FIs—can be enlisted to explain 
trait covariation without necessarily positing a distinct role 
for structural factors. 
As we have detailed here, explanations of behavioral 
trait covariation through process variables or FIs may of-
fer a particularly valuable method for understanding trait 
covariation. Relative to explanations of covariation that en-
list structural factors, such explanations more directly pro-
vide a specific process understanding of where behavioral 
trait levels come from, and of how (and perhaps how much) 
they might be altered. Such a framework should thus help 
us shed new light not just on the specific sources of trait co-
variation, but on many other issues concerning the nature 
of personality traits.
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Appendix A: Measures of Big Five-Related Traits  
Used in Study 1
Assertive: BFI: Has an Assertive personality; IIDL: Bold/assertive 
Sociable: BFI: Is Outgoing, sociable; IIDL: Outgoing/sociable 
Warm: BFI: can be cold and aloof R, IIDL: kind-hearted/caring; 
unfriendly/cold R; affectionate/loving) 
Polite: BFI: is sometimes rude to others R; IIDL: rude/inconsid-
erate R, courteous/polite, pleasant/agreeable 
Reliable: BFI: Is a reliable worker; IIDL: Dependable/reliable, un-
dependable/unreliable R
Orderly: BFI: Tends to be disorganized; disorganized/messy 
Nervous: BFI: Worries a lot; Remains calm in tense situations R; 
can Be tense; IIDL: Tense/anxious 
Irritable: BFI: Can be moody; IIDL: Crabby/grouchy; angry/hos-
tile; touchy/temperamental 
Creative: BFI: Is original, comes up with new ideas; Is inventive; 
IIDL: Creative/imaginative 
Unconventional: IIDL: Radical/rebellious; traditional/conven-
tional R
Note: Subscript “R” indicates item was reverse-scored.
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Supplemental Materials 
How Functionalist and Process Approaches to Behavior Can Explain Trait Covariation 
by D. Wood et al., 2014, Psychological Review 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0038423 
 
Supplementary Materials 1 (S1) 
Extended Study 1 and Study 2 Methods 
Study 1 Method 
Part 1: Generating Potential FIs Underlying Big Five-Related Behaviors  
A total of 529 Wake Forest University undergraduates over two semesters completed an online 
survey in order to earn credit towards a course research participation requirement. Participants ranged in 
age from 17 to 23 (M = 18.68; 59% female). Participants were informed that they might be invited to 
participate in an interview on the basis of their answers. 
Big Five trait assessments. Participants completed the Big Five Inventory (BFI; John & 
Srivastava, 1999), Inventory of Individual Differences in the Lexicon (IIDL; Wood, Nye, & Saucier, 
2010), and items from the International Personality Item Pool (Goldberg, 1999) identified as highly 
associated with Big Five trait levels; many of the IPIP items are provided in Supplementary Materials 2 
(S2). Big Five estimates for the IIDL were created by averaging the five items with the highest 
correlations with a given Big Five trait reported in Wood, Nye, and Saucier (2010). Big Five scores from 
the BFI, IIDL, and IPIP measures for each dimension were then standardized and averaged. The 
reliability of these three-scale composites was .95 for Extraversion, .91 for Agreeableness, .91 for 
Conscientiousness, .93 for Neuroticism, and .85 for Openness.  
Interviews with participants high and low on Big Five dimensions. Participants with the 
highest and lowest scores from the three-measure Big Five composites were invited to participate in one-
on-one interviews for additional class credit. Each interview lasted approximately 15 to 20 minutes. Five 
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to six individuals from each end of each Big Five trait were interviewed, resulting in a total of 52 
interviews. 
Interviewed participants were asked to describe the extent to which they performed eight to ten 
behaviors related to the trait they were selected for, and why. These behaviors were adapted from IPIP 
items found to be highly related to Big Five trait scores. For instance, the IPIP items “I start 
conversations” and “I don’t talk a lot” were rephrased as questions “Are you typically someone who starts 
conversations?” and “Would you say that you talk a lot?” A full listing of the items asked in these 
interviews is provided in the Supplementary Materials 2 (S2). 
Interviewers were instructed to probe for reasons interviewees performed the behaviors at that 
level. In particular, interviewers were instructed to ask participants if there were things (a) that they 
liked/disliked about doing the behavior, or that made them seek/avoid doing the behavior, (b) that made it 
easy/hard for them to perform the behavior, and (c) about any other aspects of the situation that 
influenced their decision to act the way they did. This process continued until either all questions were 
asked or 20 minutes had passed.  
Reports of others’ high and low Big Five trait levels. All participants who completed the initial 
survey in the second semester of data collection (N=229) were asked at the conclusion of the survey to 
think of someone they knew who acted in an extremely trait-typical way, and to describe reasons for their 
behavior. This was done to elicit additional functions that may not have been provided by participants in 
explaining their own behavior.  
Each participant was randomly assigned to describe someone they knew who was high or low on 
one of the Big Five traits. Descriptions of the desired target were created by using three synonymous 
adjectives and a pair of behaviors highly associated with the Big Five dimension. For instance, in the high 
extraversion condition, participants were asked “Think of someone you know who is very sociable, 
extraverted and outgoing. This is someone who regularly starts conversations with others and who 
regularly talks to lots of different people at parties.” Between 21 and 26 individuals were assigned to each 
of the 10 conditions (two ends of each Big Five trait); instructions for the remaining traits are in the 
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Supplementary Materials 2 (S2).  
Participants were then instructed to respond to the following questions: “First, list some instances 
in which you recall this person acting in the ways just described.” To elicit reasons for these behaviors, 
participants were then asked: “What do you think are some of the reasons that he or she tends to act in 
this way?”; “What are some of the things that make it easy for the person to act this way? What are some 
of the reasons that make it hard for the person to act in a different way?”; and finally “Put yourself in this 
person’s shoes. Why do you think this person wants to act in this way? Why do you think this person does 
not want to act in a different way?”  
Extraction of reasons for trait-related behavior from interviews and reports. Research 
assistants then extracted reasons for trait-related behaviors from the participant interviews and reports of 
others’ behavior. Coders were given instructions describing what constituted an appropriate “reason” for 
trait-related behavior, which consisted of statements of different types of valuations and goals, abilities, 
and effects/expectancies. Two coders listened separately to each recorded interview and copied verbatim 
any reasons that the interviewees provided to explain their behavior. Coders then reconciled discrepancies 
while listening to the interview a second time together. Finally, each reason was summarized into a short 
phrase or sentence. For the free-response survey answers of others’ behaviors, the second author extracted 
reasons from the responses provided, making each reason into a one-sentence item. Ultimately, 1,985 
reasons were initially extracted across all Big Five traits. 
Reduction of reasons for trait-related behavior. Three coders (the second author and two 
research assistants) were then provided with instructions to sort this larger set of 1,985 items into a 
smaller set of item groups to eliminate redundancies within each Big Five trait. To aid with this task, they 
were instructed to first classify each item into one of nine more specific categories: (1) abilities; (2) 
behavior-outcome expectancies; (3) situation construals; (4) felt pressures and needs; (5) likes and 
dislikes; (6) preferences; (7) values and standards; (8) concerns and worries, and (9) goals. Coders were 
then instructed to group similar items while maintaining as many distinctions as possible. After doing this 
separately, coders met to form a unified set of distinct reasons for high or low levels of each Big Five 
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trait. This was done separately for each Big Five trait, resulting in a list of 633 item groups. 
Following this, a group of four coders (the first and second authors and two research assistants) 
met again to further reduce redundancies across all Big Five traits. Also at this stage, preference items 
were split apart to make separate items involving how much the person liked each object implied in the 
preference item (e.g., “I prefer being alone” was separated to “I like being alone” and “I like being with 
people”). Following this stage, the list of reasons for Big Five trait-related behavior was further reduced 
into a smaller list of 463 distinct reasons. 
Part 2: Linking Functionality indicators to Big-Five Related Traits 
We continued by exploring how these FIs were empirically associated with variation in 
behavioral traits associated with the Big Five. 
Participants. A total of 537 Wake Forest University students from an introductory psychology 
course completed the items described above via an online survey. Participants were removed if they left 
over 20 of the items blank, or if they had no variability in their responses for major sections of the survey 
(e.g., answering “2” to every question within a particular subsection). These removals resulted in a final 
sample size of 511 participants ranging in age from 17 to 37 years (M = 18.7, 57% female).  
Measures of Big-Five Related Behavioral Traits. Participants completed self-ratings of the BFI 
(John & Srivastava, 1999) and the IIDL (Wood, Nye, & Saucier, 2010). Using items across these two 
inventories, we estimated two distinct behavioral traits within each Big Five trait domain. In constructing 
these measures, we excluded any items that concerned self-perceptions of valuations or goals, abilities, or 
expectancies (e.g., the BFI Agreeableness item “likes to cooperate with others”), to focus on more clearly 
behavioral trait items and self-perceptions. We also attempted to measure traits close to the two major 
“subfacets” within each Big Five domain recently described by DeYoung, Quilty, and Peterson (2007) 
and Soto and John (2009). Following these considerations, the items used to construct these 10 scales are 
given in Appendix A, and alpha values are provided in Table 1. 
FIs associated with Big Five-related behaviors. The 463 FIs ultimately generated from Part 1 
were adapted into questionnaire statements using four different question-response formats. Items 
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pertaining to likes and dislikes were rated under the instruction “How much do you like or dislike the 
following things?” with a scale ranging from 1 (Strongly dislike this) to 5 (Strongly like this). Items 
pertaining to goals were rated under the instruction “How much do you try or want to do the following 
behaviors?” with a scale ranging from 1 (I try very hard to avoid doing this) to 5 (I try very hard to do 
this). Items pertaining to abilities were rated under the instruction “How easy or hard do you find doing 
the following things when you try to (or feel that you should)?” with a scale ranging from 1 (I find it very 
difficult to do this) to 5 (I find it very easy to do this). All remaining items were rated under the general 
instruction “How much do you agree with each statement?” with a response scale ranging from 1 
(Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). The complete inventory is available from the first author.  
We then reduced the complete set of 463 items to a more manageable set of approximately 100 
items. To identify content most frequently reflected in the inventory and to organize content similarities, 
we conducted a hierarchical cluster analysis, using procedures similar to those described by Wood, Nye 
and Saucier (2010). We first constructed a dendrogram using the within-group linkage algorithm; in order 
to allow antonymous content to be placed on the same cluster, we included all 463 items in their original 
form as well as reverse-scored variables of all items, resulting in a cluster analysis of 926 items. We 
considered items as forming a cluster if at least two items clustered together in the dendrogram by 
showing intercorrelations of a magnitude of .35 or higher. Many of the larger clusters were then broken 
into smaller subclusters when there was clear evidence that the subsets of the items reflected different 
gradients of meaning. This was indicated more formally by entering the items from the larger clusters into 
a factor analysis using principle axis factoring and oblimin rotations, and identifying if there were two or 
more groups of items (each consisting of at least two items) which had fairly distinct factor loadings from 
one another, generally by having at least two items on each factor with at least .60 loadings and minor 
cross-loadings. These procedures resulted in the extraction of 87 clusters.  
 Finally, we correlated all 463 items with the 61 items of the IIDL. We used this to aid in selecting 
one item to represent each of the 87 clusters; items with greater correlations with the IIDL items (either 
by having a large maximum correlation, or by having many IIDL items correlated at a level of |r| ≥ .10) 
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were given preference. We also examined this matrix to identify additional single items that were not 
located on multi-item clusters but that showed large correlations with an IIDL item, or that showed 
correlations above an absolute magnitude of .20 with 10 or more IIDL items. These additional 
considerations resulted in the identification of an additional 12 items, resulting in a total of 99 FI items. 
Study 2 Method 
Participants 
A total of 700 ESCS participants completed the materials examined here as part of an ongoing 
study. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 85 (M = 51.4, 56% female), and were of all levels of 
education. See Goldberg (2008) for additional details. 
Materials 
Saucier Mini-Markers. In this study, we utilized the Saucier Mini-Markers (SMM; Saucier, 
1994) as our measure of personality due to its unique advantage among resources collected within the 
ESCS sample of being administered multiple times in the form of both self-ratings and peer-ratings. In the 
fall of 1998, participants both completed the SMM themselves, and were asked to recruit up to three 
people they knew well to describe them on the SMM. Additionally, the participants rated themselves on 
the SMM earlier in the summer of 1993, and in the spring of 1995. Consequently, there were up to three 
self-ratings and up to three peer-ratings of the SMM that could be used for each participant.  
Similar to Study 1, we selected two indicators from each Big Five domain, which were examined 
separately. The two trait indicators were selected (1) to measure distinct behavioral traits within the Big 
Five domain, and (2) to the extent possible parallel the traits examined in Study 1 (i.e., the traits listed 
within Table 1). We also only included items that were positive indicators of the dimension (e.g., for 
kindness, the item “kind” would be a positive indicator and “harsh” a negative indicator). This resulted in 
the selection of the items bold and extraverted within the domain of Extraversion; kind and cooperative in 
the domain of Agreeableness; organized and practical in the domain of Conscientiousness, fretful and 
temperamental in the domain of Neuroticism, and creative and philosophical in the domain of Openness.  
Scales were formed by aggregating the self-ratings of these traits made in the three different 
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administrations; the reliabilities are shown in Table 3 and ranged from .62 to .86. Peer rating scales were 
formed by aggregating the 1 to 3 peer ratings obtained in Fall 1998. The intraclass correlations for peer 
ratings of the same participant, shown in Table 3, ranged from .13 to .35. Since participants were rated by 
an average of 2.5 peers, using the Spearman-Brown prophecy formula we estimated the approximate 
reliabilities of the average peer-rated scales as ranging from .27 to .57.  
International Personality Item Pool (IPIP). ESCS participants completed up to 2492 distinct 
items between Spring 1994 and Spring 2003. These items consisted of relatively short items in which 
people described a wide range of behavioral traits, feelings, skills, beliefs, and more abstract self-
perceptions. Participants rated about 50 of these items both in Spring 1994 and again in Fall 1995, 
allowing for estimation of the test-retest reliability over about a year. For these items, the test-retest 
correlations averaged .52, which we use as an approximation of the one-year test-retest reliability or 
dependability of the IPIP items. 
Identification of functionality indicators (FIs) within the IPIP items. Given the heterogeneity of 
content within the IPIP, the first and third authors and a research assistant categorized the IPIP items into 
1 of 7 categories. The first six collectively consist of the IPIP items we considered FIs; we list the 
categories and some common IPIP item stems: (1) likes/dislikes (e.g., “[Like/dislike]…”, “[Prefer/prefer 
not] to…” “Feel [happy/bad] when…”; (2) goals (e.g., “[Want/seek/avoid]…” “[Try/try not] to…”), (3) 
values (e.g., “People [should/shouldn’t]…” “Expect others [to/not to]…” “[Allow/let]…” “It is important 
[to/not to]…”), (4) contingencies of emotion/attention (e.g., “Am [concerned/not concerned] about…” 
“[Pay/don’t pay] attention to…”, “When in [situation], I feel [emotion]”); (5) abilities (e.g., 
“[Can/can’t]…” “Am [easily/not easily]…” “[Know/Don’t know] how to…” “Am [good/bad] at…”); (6) 
beliefs/situation perceptions (e.g., “[Believe/do not believe] that…” “[Experience/feel 
that]…”“[Know/don’t know] that…”).  
Finally, outside of these categories, items could be categorized as concerning (7) 
behaviors/identities/reputations, which especially concerned rates of behavior (e.g., “Tend to…”, “When 
in [situation], do [response]”), expected rates of behavior (e.g., “Would [probably/never]” and abstract 
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trait perceptions. We also placed items in this category that had functional content that was vague or non-
specific (e.g., “Worry about minor things”).  
There was relatively consistent categorization of these items into these categories: 1451 of the 
total 2413 IPIP items (60%) were placed in the same category by all raters; 785 (33%) were placed into 
the same category by two of the three raters, and only 177 (7%) were placed into a different category by 
each rater; although frequently all raters categorized such items into one of the first six FI categories. Any 
discrepancy beyond universal placement was discussed by the three raters. Of the 2492 items contained 
within the IPIP, 1351 (54%) were categorized as perceptions of FIs; these categorizations are available 
from the first author upon request.  
Identifying functions associated with Big Five-related trait perceptions. We conducted a 
multi-step process to identify FIs related to the ten traits examined, and to reduce these to a smaller set 
that could be used to represent the diverse functions within the body of the text. Although this procedure 
was similar to that used in Study 1, some differences were necessary given the presence of both self- and 
peer-ratings of these participants and the much larger item pool used in this sample.  
First, as the pattern of correlations between IPIP items and trait perceptions tended to be similar 
across both self-ratings and peer-ratings of traits (across the 1351 functional IPIP items, the vector 
correlation for how items were associated with self- and peer-ratings ranged from .94 for “extraverted” to 
.57 for “practical”), we averaged the item’s correlation with the self-reported trait and with the peer-
reported trait together. Second, for each of the 10 traits, we found the 100 items that had the highest 
absolute correlation with the trait. This resulted in reducing the 1351 functional IPIP items to a smaller set 
of the 630 items that were most highly associated with the 10 trait perceptions across self- and peer-
reports. These items and their reversals were then entered into a cluster analysis, where we pre-specified 
the extraction of 75 clusters, again using the within-group average linkage algorithm, and using 
correlations as the similarity coefficient. These clusters ranged in size from 24 items, to one cluster with 
one item which was not considered further. 
For the remaining 74 clusters, we selected a single item to indicate how the cluster was associated 
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with trait perceptions. We chose to use single items in order to make the number of items used to 
represent the cluster uniform, and so the cluster could be represented by providing the complete item 
within Table 4. To help in the selection of an item that indicated how the cluster as a whole related to Big 
Five-related trait perceptions, we conducting an inverse factor analysis, where the items within the cluster 
were entered as variables and the rows depicted the item’s correlations with the 20 trait perceptions, 
considering self- and peer-ratings separately. The items with the highest factor loading within the 
associated covariance matrix provided an indication of which items were most representative of the 
cluster. We then selected an item from among the highest loading items which seemed to refer 
semantically to the content of the cluster and to a specific valuation, ability, and or perceived effect or 
situation construal. For instance, the items “Suspect hidden motives in others” and “Don’t care about the 
rules” were selected over the items “Distrust others” and “Resist society’s rules,” respectively, due to the 
former items referring less ambiguously to FIs rather than to behavioral tendencies.  
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Supplementary Materials 2 (S2) 
Materials for Generating Reasons for Trait-Related Behavior 
1. Interview Questions for Generating Explanations of Big Five Related Behaviors  
 
Original IPIP Item Interview Item 
Extraversion  
I start conversations. Are you typically someone that starts conversations?  
I don’t talk a lot. Would you say that you talk a lot? 
I am skilled in handling social situations. How skilled would you say that you are in handling social 
situations? 
I keep in the background. Do you feel that you keep to the background in social 
situations, or that you make yourself prominent? 
I talk to lots of different people at parties. Would you say that you talk to lots of different people at 
parties? 
I find it difficult to approach others. How easy do you feel that it is to approach other people? 
I make friends easily. Would you say that you make friends easily? 
I often feel uncomfortable around others. How comfortable are you around other people? 
I warm up quickly to others. Would you say that you are someone who warms up quickly 
to others? 
I seem to derive less enjoyment from 
interacting with other people than others 
do. 
Do you feel that you get more or less enjoyment from 
interacting with people than others do? 
  
Agreeableness  
I sympathize with others’ feelings. Would you say that you tend to sympathize with other 
peoples’ feelings? 
I insult people. Would you say that you are someone who insults people? 
I respect others. How much would you say that you respect other people? 
I look down on others. Do you feel that you look down on other people? 
I accept people as they are. Would you say that you tend to accept people as they are? 
I get back at others. If someone does you wrong, will you tend to try to get back 
at them? 
I find that it takes a lot to make me feel 
angry at someone. 
Would you say that it takes a lot to make you angry at 
someone? 
I point out others’ mistakes. Would you say that you are someone who points out mistakes 
that other people make? 
I listen to people’s problems. Are you someone who will listen to people’s problems? 
I tell offensive jokes. Do you tell offensive jokes? 
  
Conscientiousness  
I follow through with my plans. Would you say that you typically follow through with plans 
you make? 
I don’t finish the things that you start. Would you say that you finish the things that you start? 
I usually take care of my responsibilities as 
soon as possible. 
When you have responsibilities, would you say that you are 
someone who takes care of them as soon as you can? 
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I find it difficult to organize tasks and 
activities. 
Do you have difficulty organizing tasks and activities? 
I complete tasks successfully. Are you someone who completes tasks successfully? 
I have difficulty keeping my attention on a 
task. 
Do you have difficulty keeping your attention on tasks? 
I like to organize things. Are you someone who likes to organize things? 
I hardly ever finish things on time. Are you someone who finishes things on time? 
  
Emotional Stability   
I am relaxed most of the time. Are you usually a relaxed person? 
I get stressed out easily. Are you someone who gets stressed out easily? 
I remain calm under pressure. Are you someone who remains calm under pressure? 
I panic easily. Would you say you are someone who panics easily? 
I rarely worry. Would you say that you are someone who worries a lot? 
I am moody.  Are you a moody person? 
I am not easily bothered by things. Are you easily bothered by things? 
I am afraid of many things. Would you say that you are afraid of many things? 
  
Openness  
I believe in the importance of art. Do you believe in the importance of art? 
I seldom notice the emotional aspects of 
paintings and pictures. 
Are you someone who notices the emotional aspects of 
paintings and pictures? 
I have a vivid imagination. Do you have a vivid imagination? 
I am not interested in abstract ideas. Are you someone who is interested in abstract ideas? 
I see beauty in things that others might not 
notice. 
Do you think that you see beauty in things that others might 
not notice? 
I do not like art. Do you like art? 
I enjoy hearing new things. Are you someone who enjoys hearing new things? 
I have difficulty understanding abstract 
ideas. 
Do you have an easy or difficulty time understanding abstract 
ideas? 
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2. Materials for Generating Explanations of Big Five-Related Behaviors in Others 
 
High Extraversion: Think of someone you know who is very sociable, extraverted, and outgoing. This is 
someone who regularly starts conversations with others and who regularly talks to lots of different people 
at parties. [26] 
 
Low Extraversion: Think of someone you know who is very reserved, introverted, and shy. This is 
someone who regularly keeps in the background in social situations and who regularly has a difficult time 
approaching others. [22] 
 
High Agreeableness: Think of someone you know who is very compassionate, agreeable, and kind-
hearted. This is someone who regularly sympathizes with other people’s feelings and who regularly 
listens to other people’s problems.[21] 
 
Low Agreeableness: Think of someone you know who is very inconsiderate, disagreeable, and rude. 
This is someone who regularly insults other people and who often offends others. [23] 
 
High Conscientiousness: Think of someone you know who is very dependable, conscientious, and 
organized. This is someone who regularly follows through with the plans they make and who regularly 
completes task on time. [22] 
 
Low Conscientiousness: Think of someone you know who is very disorganized, unconscientious, and 
unreliable. This is someone who regularly starts tasks but doesn’t finish them and who regularly has 
trouble keeping his or her attention on a task. [25] 
 
High Emotional Stability: Think of someone you know who is very relaxed, calm, and emotionally 
stable. This is someone who regularly remains calm under pressure and who generally is not bothered by 
things that could easily upset other people. [22] 
 
Low Emotional Stability: Think of someone you know who is very tense, anxious, and nervous. This is 
someone who regularly gets stressed out easily and who gets worried over small things. [23] 
 
High Openness to Experience: Think of someone you know who is very curious, open to new 
experiences, and imaginative. This is someone who believes in the importance of art and who frequently 
sees beauty in things other people might not notice. [24] 
 
Low Openness to Experience: Think of someone you know who is uninterested in new experiences, 
unimaginative, and has fairly narrow interests. This is someone who does not tend to notice the emotional 
aspects of art and who regularly has a difficult time understanding abstract ideas. [21] 
 
Note. Number in parentheses provides the number of participants who provided a report for this 
instruction set. 
 
 
 
